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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Alison Beth Shawber Sachet 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Psychology 
 
March 2013 
 
Title: Children’s and Adults’ Prosocial Behavior in Real and Imaginary Social 
Interactions 
 
 
In everyday life, there are many situations that elicit emotional reactions to an 
individual’s plight, leading to empathic thoughts and helping behaviors.  But what if the 
observed situation involves fictional characters rather than real life people?  The main 
goal of this dissertation was to investigate the extent that empathic thoughts and helping 
behaviors characterize children’s responses to fictional social interactions, as well as to 
real ones.  Another goal was to develop a new measure of prosocial behavior.   
In Study 1, 60 undergraduate students (36 female; Mage = 19.87, SDage = 4.46) 
played two computerized ball-tossing games, one with 3 co-players who were believed to 
be other students and one in which a ball was tossed between 3 walls.  During the second 
half of each game, one of the co-players/walls was excluded by the other two co-
players/walls; the participant’s subsequent increase in passes to the excluded co-
player/wall was recorded.  Participants increased their passes to the excluded real co-
player more than to the excluded wall, indicating that the increase in the Real Condition 
were attempts to help another person, rather than simply to even out the distribution of 
passes.   
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Study 2 extended these findings to children and tested the relationship between 
reactions to real and fictional social interactions. Seventy-one 5- and 8-year-old children 
(36 females; 35 5-year-olds: Mage = 5 years, 8.2 months, SDage = 2.4 months; 36 8-year-
olds: Mage = 8 years, 6.5 months, SDage = 2.9 months) played the computerized ball 
tossing game with (1) other children they believed to be real, (2) novel cartoon 
characters, and (3) walls.  One of the co-players/walls was excluded in the second half of 
each game.  Although children reported similar empathic reactions towards the excluded 
real and fictional co-players, they increased their passes to the excluded real co-player 
more than to the excluded fictional character or wall (controlling for individual 
differences in real life empathy).  These results suggest that children’s emotional 
reactions to what they experience in fiction and in real life are similar, but they take the 
behavioral steps to help another individual only when that individual is believed to be a 
real person. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine yourself in your car stopped at a traffic light at a busy intersection.  A 
young mother is trying to cross the street in front of you while pushing a baby in a stroller 
with one hand and, with her other hand, holding onto a young boy who has just dropped 
his teddy bear in the middle of the street.  The mother is obviously anxious to get her 
children safely across the street before the traffic light changes, but has paused to help her 
child pick up the teddy bear.  What do you feel and what do you do in this situation?  Do 
you feel empathy for the struggling mother?  Do you feel anxious or sad for the child 
who has dropped his teddy bear?  Do you think about ways in which you could help them 
(e.g., perhaps you can quickly get out of your car to help pick up the teddy bear and get 
the family safely across the street before the light changes)?  We frequently encounter 
situations in which we experience emotional reactions to an individual’s plight, leading to 
empathy (i.e., emotional arousal and thoughts that are congruent with another’s emotional 
state), which motivates us to develop a plan for prosocial behavior (i.e., voluntary actions 
that are intended to help another) (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2007).   
But what if the observed situation is fictional?  When children and adults hear a 
story or create their own narratives, they have the striking capacity to be “transported” to 
an imagined world where they become absorbed in the mental simulation (Gerrig, 1993; 
Oatley, 1999).  Part of this experience involves forming attachments and responding 
emotionally to the characters in the story (e.g., adults cry when a beloved character dies 
in a novel; children express love for their imaginary companions).  In fictional contexts, 
do emotional reactions to imaginary social situations give rise to action plans or fantasies 
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of how to help a character?  If emotional responses elicit prosocial thoughts towards a 
fictional character, then fiction could provide a training ground for developing prosocial 
behavior that ultimately might contribute to altruism in social interactions in real life.   
In this dissertation, I investigated the extent to which there are similarities in 
empathetic and prosocial reactions to real and fictional social interactions.  My first step 
was to develop a new measure of prosocial behavior and to test it with a sample of adults 
(Study 1).  In this initial study, the measure of prosocial behavior involved responses to a 
situation with real people.  The second step was to adapt this measure for use with 
children and to add a condition that involved fictional characters (Study 2).  Thus in 
Study 2, it was possible to compare the prosocial behavior of children (5- and 8-year-
olds) in response to real and fictional social interactions.  To provide context for Studies 
1 and 2, I first briefly review research investigating the development of prosocial 
behavior and then discuss the correspondence between fictional and real experiences.    
Development of Prosocial Behavior 
Prosocial behavior across childhood is associated with successful peer 
relationships (Farver & Branstetter, 1994), high levels of social competence (Bear & Rys, 
1994), mature self-regulation skills (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Hershey, 1994), advanced social 
problem-solving skills (Marsh, Serafica, & Barenboim, 1981), less conflict with friends 
(Dunn, Cutting, & Fisher, 2002), and low levels of aggression and externalizing problems 
(Caprara, Barbaranelli, & Pastorelli, 2001).  In adulthood, prosocial behavior (e.g., 
engaging in volunteer work) is related to lower levels of depression (Wilson & Musick, 
1999), greater life satisfaction (Wheeler, Gorey, & Greenblatt, 1998), higher self-esteem 
(Newman, Vasudev, & Onawola, 1986), and having quality social relationships 
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(Weinstein & Ryan, 2010).  It is clearly important to identify the factors that are related 
to individual differences in the development of prosocial behavior, which is one of the 
goals of this dissertation. 
The early precursors of prosocial behavior are observed in the rudimentary 
empathic responses of young infants (e.g., crying when they hear another baby crying; 
Martin & Clark, 1982; Sagi & Hoffman, 1976).  By 8 months of age, babies engage in 
basic prosocial behavior, such as sharing objects (Hay & Rheingold, 1983) and by 12 
months, they often provide positive contact (e.g., a hug) or verbal reassurance in reaction 
to another person’s emotional distress (Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, Emde 1992).  Infants 
this age also offer objects as support for others in distress, but the objects tend to be ones 
that the child himself or herself would find comforting (e.g., the child’s pacifier or teddy 
bear; Eisenberg et al., 2007).  Between 14- and 36- months of age, empathic concern and 
prosocial behavior increase in reaction to an experimenter or mother’s feigned distress 
(Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992).  During this time, younger 
toddlers are capable of instrumental helping (i.e., helping someone to complete an 
interrupted action), whereas older toddlers are able to engage in empathic helping (i.e., 
helping in order to alleviate someone else’s distress).  By 30 months of age, children are 
beginning to show signs of altruistic helping (i.e., helping someone at one’s own cost) 
(Svetlova, Nichols, & Brownell, 2010).   
Further increases in prosocial behavior develop between the preschool and 
elementary school years as children gain better perspective taking skills and have more 
opportunities for social interactions with same-age peers (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998).  
Adolescents tend to have higher levels of prosocial behavior than 7- to 12-year-olds for 
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sharing and donating, but not for instrumental helping or comforting (Eisenberg & Fabes, 
1998) and there is some evidence that during adolescence, there is a decline in helping 
victims of aggression (Lindeman, Harakka, & Keltikangas-Jarvinen, 1997).  It is 
important to note that these age trends do not hold for all studies, mostly due to varying 
methods of data collection, but in a meta-analysis controlling for the type of method and 
measures used, Eisenberg and Fabes (1998) found substantial evidence that prosocial 
behavior increases with age from infancy through adolescence.  There are also individual 
differences that show stability over time; children’s relative levels of prosocial behavior 
at age 6-years were similar to their relative levels at 12 years (Côté, Tremblay, Nagin, 
Zoccolillo, & Vitaro, 2002).  
Age-related changes in prosocial behavior are associated with sociocognitive 
factors, which include being able to understand and decode others’ emotions (Batson, 
1991; Eisenberg et al., 2007), as well as evaluative and planning processes (Krebs & Van 
Hesteren, 1994).  These factors, associated with theory of mind (i.e., the ability to take 
the perspective of another person and to recognize people’s behaviors in terms of their 
mental states) and executive function (i.e., mental skills that allow us to regulate, control 
and manage other cognitive processes, including planning, attention, working memory, 
and inhibition) develop from infancy through adolescence (Harris, 2006; Zelazo & 
Carlson, 2012).  With development, children are increasingly able to recognize that other 
people are distressed, with older children being able to recognize more subtle cues.  
Furthermore, perspective taking and executive abilities allow children to weigh the costs 
and benefits of helping, with older children weighing costs to the self less and being more 
attuned to the social benefits than younger children (Eisenberg et al., 2007).  Children’s 
  5
motivations to engage in prosocial behavior have also been found to change over time.  
Younger children are thought to be motivated to help others when they believe that they 
will gain material rewards or avoid punishment, whereas older children are thought to be 
motivated by social approval and reciprocity (i.e., they recognize that they will be more 
likely to be helped in the future if they help other people now) (Bar-Tal, Raviv, & Leiser, 
1980). 
Measurement of prosocial behavior.  In adults, prosocial behavior is primarily 
measured with self-report questionnaires (e.g., Caprara, Steca, Zelli, & Capanna, 2005), 
which have the drawback that social desirability or social influence might contribute to 
responses.  For children, the methods used to investigate the development of prosocial 
behavior have included: parent or teacher questionnaire (e.g., Ladd, Herald-Brown, & 
Andrews, 2009), child interviews, children’s reports of what they might do in a 
hypothetical situation, requests for children to help or share with another person in a 
controlled setting (e.g., Eisenberg, Guthrie, Murphy, Shepard, Cumberland, & Carlo, 
1999), and the recording of children’s responses to altruistic opportunities (e.g., giving 
stickers/money/candy that children are told will be distributed to poor children; Iannotti, 
1978).  Other assessment techniques have been to observe children’s spontaneous 
prosocial behavior (e.g., sharing toys, comforting a distressed peer) in a naturalistic 
setting (Eisenberg et al., 1999) or by setting up a scenario in which child or adult 
participants have the opportunity to help an experimenter or confederate (e.g., Chambers 
& Ascione, 1987; Greitemeyer & Osswald, 2010).  This approach can provide rich 
information, but is laborious (even for snapshots of behavior) and often the observational 
data are difficult to code and interpret.  A goal of this dissertation was to develop a 
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behavioral assessment that was relatively free of social desirability influences and was 
easy to administer in the laboratory.   
Correspondence Between Responses to Fictional and Real Life Experiences 
Thus far, I have discussed prosocial behavior pertaining to real life situations.  
But humans have the capacity to empathize with and experience emotional reactions and 
attachments to fictional characters despite knowing that the fictional characters and the 
situations in their stories are not real (Mar & Oatley, 2008).  The idea that fiction 
simulates real world scenarios and social interactions dates to ancient philosophers, such 
as Aristotle, who were fascinated by the concept of mimesis, or simulated representations 
that occurs from being exposed to fictional narratives (Halliwell, 2002).  Recently there 
has been a surge of interest in the possibility that the simulation of emotion that is 
experienced in fiction provides insight into real world social interactions and thus has real 
life significance (Mar & Oatley, 2008; Zunshine, 2006).  
In discussing this research, it is important to recognize that there are many types 
of fictional experiences that vary in several respects (e.g., whether they are created by the 
self or by others).  Here I discuss the correspondence between real life and (1) internally 
generated mental imagery, (2) the consumption of fictional narratives in books, movies 
and other sources, and (3) children’s pretend play.   
Mental imagery.  Mental imagery is the experience of a perception in the 
absence of immediate sensory input (e.g., being able to imagine the sound of a dog 
barking or an image of a dog).  This ability is thought to be important for memory, spatial 
and abstract reasoning, learning skills, language comprehension, and other cognitive 
skills (Kosslyn, Behrmann, & Jeannerod, 1995).  Many studies have found a 
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correspondence between the reaction time, behavior, and brain areas associated with 
actual motor or perceptual experiences and mental imagery across several domains, such 
as motor action, vision, and audition.  For example, when asked to imagine grasping and 
to actually grasp an object, both adults (Johnson, 2000) and young children (Sachet, Frey, 
Jacobson, & Taylor, under review) imagine holding and actually hold their hand in the 
same way.  Neuroimaging research has shown that common brain areas are activated 
during real motor action and motor imagery (Jacobs, Danielmeier, & Frey, 2010; 
Johnson-Frey, Newman-Norlund, & Grafton, 2005), actual visual experience and visual 
imagery (Kosslyn, Gannis, and Thompson, 2001; O’Craven & Kanwisher, 2000), and 
real auditory perception and auditory imagery (Zatorre, Halpern, Perry, Meyer, & Evans, 
1996).  Single, specific neurons have also been found to fire selectively during both 
actual vision and visual imagery (Kreiman, Koch, Fried, 2000).  
There is a large body of research examining the effects of mental practice 
(imagining oneself performing an action) and mental simulation in facilitating physical 
and cognitive performance and positive social behaviors.  In the physical domain, mental 
practice improves real execution of actions (e.g., jumping hurdles, throwing a ball 
towards a target) in adults (Driskell, Cooper, & Moran, 1994) and children (Doussoulin 
& Rehbein, 2011).  Mental practice of cognitive tasks, such as solving math problems, 
has also been found to promote real performance on the cognitive task in both adults 
(Ginns, Chandler, & Sweller, 2003) and children (Leahy & Sweller, 2004).  There have 
also been facilitative effects of mental simulation in the social domain.  Crisp and Turner 
(2009) suggest that imagining positive intergroup interactions leads to positive attitudes 
and reduced stereotyping towards an out-group, which promotes positive interactions 
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with real out-group members (Brambilla, Ravenna, & Hewstone, 2012; Turner & West, 
2012).  In clinical settings, imagined interactions or situations are often used in therapy as 
ways to cope with issues such as trauma or anxiety (Porat & Sadeh, in press; Sheikh, 
2002).   
Fictional narratives in books, movies, and other sources.  Several studies have 
found a relationship between experiencing fictional narratives and real situations.  Some 
authors have argued that this correspondence is what makes fiction so interesting and 
engaging (e.g., Zunshine, 2011).  Fiction (experienced in the form of novels, movies, 
television, theater, comic books, etc.) parallels real life thoughts, desires, and emotions, 
providing deep insight into the human experience (Saunders, 2011; Zunshine, 2011).  For 
example, the emotional reactions that we experience in response to fiction are similar to 
the emotional reactions we have toward real life situations (e.g., we laugh when 
something funny happens to our favorite character in a novel just as we laugh when 
something funny happens to our best friend in real life) (Harris, 2000; Oatley, 1999).  The 
emotions that we experience in reaction to fiction are often powerful and long lasting, 
just as they are in reaction to real life events (Mar, Oatley, Djikic, Mullin, 2010).  The 
processing that takes place while reading fictional narratives also parallels that of the 
processing that occurs during real social interactions (Mar, Oatley, Hirsh, dela Paz, & 
Peterson, 2006).  When adults read and when children are read to, they take the 
perspective of the characters in the story, mentally representing the characters’ emotions 
and mental states (Ozyurek & Trabasso, 1997; Rall & Harris, 2000), much like we do 
when interacting with other people (Harris, 2006).  For example, adult readers create 
mental models of the characters, which they update as new information become available 
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(Rapp, Gerrig, & Prentice, 2001).  Without the ability to interpret protagonists’ behaviors 
in terms of certain mental states, reading fiction would not be understandable, much less 
enjoyable (Zunshine, 2006, 2008, 2011).  In fact, there is evidence that people with 
autism, who have deficits in theory of mind ability (Baron-Cohen, 1995), have difficulty 
understanding fictional narrative (Barnes, Lombardo, Wheelright, Baron-Cohen, 2009) 
and thus, find more enjoyment in reading expository nonfiction than fictional narratives 
(Zunshine, 2011). 
Because of these processing similarities, it is not surprising that the brain areas 
that are activated while reading narratives, primarily those associated with mentalizing 
(i.e., seeking to understand the minds of others), are similar to those that are activated 
during real social interactions (Mar, 2004).  People also exhibit similar physiological 
responses (e.g., heart rate, galvanic skin response, startle response) when reading about 
emotional content in fiction as when experiencing the same emotion in real life (Harris, 
2000).  Furthermore, when reading certain action words (e.g., ‘to kick’), the brain areas 
associated with the body part used for that action are activated (e.g., the leg) 
(Pulvermüller, Härle, Hummel, 2001).  
Although there is some research suggesting that reading fiction can positively 
influence our real world attitudes (Appel & Richter, 2007, Green, 2004; Green & Brock, 
2000; Prentice, Gerrig, & Bailis, 1997; Strange & Leung, 1999), much of the research 
about the effects of exposure to fiction has focused on the negative behavioral 
consequences of television and videogames.  In a classic study by Bandura, Ross, and 
Ross (1963), children who watched a movie of an adult playing aggressively with a Bobo 
doll were more aggressive towards the doll themselves when they were given a chance to 
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play with the doll.  Several other studies have shown that being exposed to violent 
television and videogames increases children’s relational and physical aggression in real 
social interactions (Anderson et al., 2003; Bushman & Anderson, 2002).   
Although there is substantial research showing the negative effects of viewing 
media, there is also research showing the children can learn positive behaviors and skills 
from television and videogames.  Children can learn new vocabulary words in their 
native language (Rice & Woodsmall, 1988) and a second language (Linebarger & 
Walker, 2005) by watching shows such as Sesame Street and Dora the Explorer; 
however, there are limits to this and some studies have shown that infants learn better 
from a real model rather than one on television (DeLoache et al., 2010; Kuhl, Tsao, & 
Liu, 2003; Robb, Richert, & Wartella, 2009).  
Most relevant to this dissertation, prosocial abilities can be learned from exposure 
to prosocial content in television and videogames.  Specifically, watching television 
shows with prosocial content leads to positive behaviors and attitudes (e.g., altruism, 
positive social interactions, reduced stereotyping) in children (Mares & Woodard, 2005; 
Ostrov, Gentile, & Crick, 2006).  Furthermore, when adult participants played 
videogames in which they helped characters in the game solve problems, they had 
increased prosocial thoughts (Greitemeyer & Osswald, 2011), empathy (Greitemeyer, 
Osswald, & Brauer, 2010), and helpful behavior towards a real peer (Gentile et al., 2009; 
Greitemeyer & Osswald, 2010), as well as decreased pleasure at other people’s 
misfortunes (i.e., schadenfreude; Greitemeyer et al., 2010).  With one exception 
(Chambers & Ascione, 1987), the effects of children’s engagement with prosocial content 
in videogames specifically have not been investigated.  Therefore, it has not been 
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established whether the emotional reactions elicited by interactions with fictional players 
in a videogame would give rise to action plans of prosocial behavior towards fictional 
characters and how this might relate to prosocial behavior towards real people in young 
children.  Study 2 of this dissertation addresses this issue. 
Pretend play.  Children can have intense emotional reactions while engrossed in 
pretend play (Harris, 2000).  For example, children can appear to become genuinely 
afraid when they engage in scary pretend play (e.g., Bourchier & Davis, 2000a; DiLalla 
& Watson, 1988; Golomb & Galasso, 1995; Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittall, & 
Harmer, 1991; Kavanaugh & Harris, 1999; Woolley, 1997).  Furthermore, in addition to 
reporting feelings of love towards their imaginary companions, some children discuss 
feelings of anger and annoyance with the behavior of their imaginary companions, much 
like they would in reaction to a real play partner’s unruly behavior (Taylor, Carlson, & 
Shawber, 2007).  Children also become absorbed in the fantasy and often have special 
requirements for their imaginary companions (e.g., insisting that a place be set at the 
family dinner table; making sure that the TV is turned on whenever the family goes out 
so that the imaginary companion will not be lonely when nobody is home; having a 
separate car seat in the family car so that the imaginary companion would be safe while 
driving) (Taylor, 1999).  In addition, children with imaginary companions engage in 
imaginary conversations and have face-to-face interactions with their imaginary 
companions, just as they would with a real play partner (Taylor, Shawber, & Mannering, 
2008).  These results suggest that children’s emotional and behavioral reactions to 
imagined situations are similar to their real-world reactions.   
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It is important to point out that these results do not suggest that children are 
confused about the difference between fantasy and reality.  In fact, young children are 
surprisingly adept in their ability to negotiate the boundary between fantasy and reality.  
For example, by the time children are 4 years old, they are proficient in their ability to 
classify and answer questions about the differences between real and pretend entities, 
understanding that imagining is a private mental process occurring in a person’s mind, 
that knowledge reflects reality more accurately than imagination, and that objects they 
have been asked to imagine do not really exist (Bourchier & Davis, 2000b; Bretherton & 
Beeghley, 1982; Estes, Wellman, & Woolley, 1989; Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1987; 
Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittall, & Harmer, 1991; Sharon & Woolley, 2004; Wellman 
& Estes, 1986; Woolley & Wellman, 1993).  Children’s strong emotional responses to 
fiction and their absorption in pretend play has been interpreted as evidence that they are 
confused about the difference between fantasy and reality.  However, it has been pointed 
out that children’s reactions are not altogether different from adults’ experiences of 
becoming immersed and responding emotionally to fictional worlds in books, movies, 
and other media (Harris, 2000; Taylor, 1999; Woolley, 1997). 
In children, pretend play, especially role play, which involves imagining and 
acting out the part of another person or creature, is widely believed to contribute to 
children’s understanding of the real world (e.g., Bretherton, 1984; Harris, 2000).  
Children’s real world knowledge influences the content of their pretend play (Engle, in 
press), but children have also been found to learn real world knowledge via pretend play 
(Sutherland & Friedman, 2012).  Furthermore, play therapy, which is a common 
therapeutic technique used with young children, relies on the premise that real world 
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problems can be ameliorated by engaging in pretend play (Russ & Fehr, in press).  
However, this positive view of pretend play has recently been challenged.  According to 
Lillard and colleagues (2012), pretend play might just be one possible contributor or even 
merely a byproduct of other variables related to healthy development.  In addition, there 
is some empirical evidence that children do not always transfer what they learn in a 
fictional context to a real world situation (Richert, Shawber, Hoffman, & Taylor, 2009).  
Thus, the correspondence between pretend play and real life is currently a controversial 
issue; more research is needed to identify the ways that pretend play might facilitate real 
life social understanding.   
Overview of Dissertation Research 
The research suggesting a correspondence between real and fictional/imagined 
situations, as well as the facilitative effects of exposure to fiction and the use of mental 
imagery on real life behavior are consistent with the possibility that the simulation of 
prosocial interactions could facilitate prosocial behavior in real life situations.  Learning 
about the manifestations of prosocial behavior in real and imaginary social interactions in 
adults is interesting, but might be particularly beneficial for children because childhood is 
when prosocial behavior and imagination are emerging and developing. 
To begin this project, it was important to identify a measure of prosocial behavior 
that could be set up to involve either real people or fictional characters.  For this purpose, 
I adapted a version of an existing task called Cyberball, a computer program developed 
by Williams and colleagues (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000; Williams, Govan, Croker, 
Tynan, Cruickshank, & Lam, 2002; Williams & Jarvis, 2006) that simulates a real, 
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interactive social experience.  Participants played a virtual game of catch (i.e., a simple 
ball tossing game) with co-players who are represented on a computer screen.  
In most previous research, the co-players in the game are described to the 
participants as real people connected over the Internet, although unbeknownst to the 
participants, the co-players are actually part of the computer program.  Williams and 
colleagues have used Cyberball to simulate the experience of social rejection by 
excluding the participant in the game of catch (e.g., Williams et al., 2000; Williams, 
2007).  Exclusion from the game elicits negative feelings, such as distress, social 
isolation, having less control, and losing a sense of belonging.  In other versions of 
Cyberball, participants observe one of the other players being socially excluded.  The 
results of these studies show that observing social exclusion elicits strong emotional 
empathic reactions towards the ostracized player in adults (Wesselmann, Bagg, & 
Williams, 2009) and adolescents (Masten, Eisenberger, Pfeifer, & Dapretto, 2010; 
Masten, Morelli, & Eisenberger, 2011).  Importantly, for adolescents the task also elicited 
thoughts about prosocial behavior towards the excluded player (Masten et al., 2010; 
Masten et al., 2011).  
In my dissertation, the Cyberball program was used to simulate the experience of 
engaging in a social interaction in which someone other than the participant was being 
socially excluded.  Participants played games of catch with three co-players.  At the 
beginning of the game (Baseline), the ball was tossed back and forth among three peers 
and the participant.  The three co-players passed equally (but randomly) to the other co-
players in the game, including the participant.  During the subsequent social exclusion 
part of the game, two of the co-players passed only to each other or to the participant.  
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Thus, in this version of Cyberball, it was someone other than the participant who was 
being socially excluded.  By recording the time course of a participant’s increases in 
passes to the excluded player, as well as the size of the increase, it was possible to index 
the participant’s prosocial responses to another person’s social exclusion.  
 Although Cyberball has been used to study prosocial thoughts and empathic 
reactions to observing another person’s social exclusion (e.g., Masten et al, 2010), it has 
not been used in this way as a behavioral index of prosocial behavior.  I investigated the 
extent that adults noticed the exclusion of a co-player and reacted to it emotionally and/or 
behaviorally.  Their responses to the exclusion of a co-player were compared to responses 
to a nonsocial version of the game, in which the ball bounced between three walls.  This 
nonsocial Control Condition was perceptually similar, but it lacked the social content 
present in the condition in which participants play catch with co-players.   
Study 2 extended Study 1 to see if the Cyberball task could be used as a 
behavioral index of prosocial behavior in young children as well as to investigate the 
extent that prosocial behavior is elicited even when children are told that the co-players 
are fictional.  Based on previous research about the correspondence between the 
emotional and behavioral responses to fictional and real life experiences, I was interested 
in the relationship between children’s reactions to real and fictional social interactions. 
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CHAPTER II 
STUDY 1 
Introduction 
The Cyberball paradigm has typically been used to investigate participants’ 
reactions to their own social exclusion.  In these studies, there is a baseline period in 
which the participant and other players throw around a virtual ball on a computer screen, 
followed by a period in which the other players begin to pass amongst themselves, 
excluding the participant.  This method of inducing the experience of social rejection has 
been used with adults (e.g., Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004), adolescents (e.g., 
Sebastian et al., 2011), and with children (e.g., Bolling et al., 2011; Moor et al., 2012).  In 
these studies, participants experience negative emotions, such as distress, social isolation, 
having less control, and losing a sense of belonging (e.g., Williams et al., 2000; Williams, 
2007).  In addition, the experience of social exclusion in Cyberball is associated with 
brain activation in areas that are associated with physical pain (Eisenberger, Lieberman, 
& Williams, 2003).   
In Study 1, I used the Cyberball paradigm as a measure of prosocial reactions to 
another person’s social exclusion.  In the few studies that have used Cyberball to 
investigate participants’ responses to another person’s social exclusion, participants 
witnessed another person’s social exclusion without taking part in the game themselves 
(i.e., the participants watched other people’s game of Cyberball on a computer screen) 
(Beeney, Franklin, Levy, & Adams, 2011; Masten et al., 2010, 2011; Wesselmann, Bagg, 
& Williams, 2009). This method allows for investigating the neural responses to another 
person’s social exclusion, and have shown that areas of the brain associated with 
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mentalizing (i.e., seeking to understand the minds of others) and experiencing physical 
pain (i.e., “feeling the pain” of the other person who had been socially rejected) were 
activated when observing another person’s social rejection.   
Study 1 differs from previous research because participants were given the 
opportunity to respond behaviorally during the game instead of merely observing 
another’s social exclusion.  Although some studies have included behavioral measures of 
prosocial behavior (Masten et al., 2010, 2011), the participants themselves were not 
involved in the Cyberball game.  For example, Masten and colleagues (Masten et al., 
2010, 2011) measured prosocial behavior by asking participants to write emails to the 
people they watched play Cyberball.  These emails were later coded for prosocial content 
that was (1) directed towards the excluded player, (2) related to social exclusion, and (3) 
realistic in the context of the email.  Prosocial responses in these emails were related to 
increases in neural activity associated with empathy for another person’s social exclusion 
in brain regions associated with mentalizing and experiencing social pain.   
Although coding the content of emails written to the co-players after the 
Cyberball game provided an assessment of prosocial behavior, it would be interesting to 
determine what participants might do to alleviate the other person’s social exclusion 
during the game.  A goal of Study 1 was to develop a behavioral measure of prosocial 
behavior that would provide an index of attempts to include the excluded player in 
Cyberball.  To do this, participants played Cyberball with three co-players, one of which 
was excluded by two of the co-players halfway through the game.  Measuring the 
participants’ increase in passes to the excluded co-player provided a behavioral index of 
prosocial behavior during the game.   
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Another goal of Study 1 was to develop a nonsocial Control Condition to use in 
comparison to the social condition in an effort to determine whether participants’ 
behavioral responses were truly prosocial (i.e., attempting to help another person) rather 
than an attempt to even out the passes.  Previous studies using Cyberball have only used 
social conditions.  In most studies, participants were explicitly told they were playing 
with other people (e.g., Williams et al., 2000; Berstein & Claypool, 2012); this is the case 
for studies examining the participants’ own social exclusion, as well as another person’s 
social exclusion.  Although in some studies, participants were told that the game was 
controlled by a computer program (e.g., Tang & Richardson, 2013; Zadro et al., 2004), 
the co-players were depicted as animated people and the game might have been 
experienced as involving social interaction.  In fact, even when participants were told that 
the game was controlled by the computer, they had negative responses to being excluded 
(e.g., lowered levels of self-esteem) that were comparable to the reactions of participants 
who believed that they were playing with other people (Tang & Richardson, 2013; Zadro 
et al., 2004).  Zadro et al. (2004) interpreted this finding as evidence that humans have an 
innate, adaptive sensitivity to any type of social exclusion, even if participants know the 
exclusion is controlled by a computer.  However, it is possible that participants 
experienced the game as involving social interaction because the co-players were 
depicted as animated people.  It is also unclear whether participants react negatively to 
exclusion (either their own or another player’s) due to social factors (e.g., feeling bad 
because other people are leaving them or another person out of the game) or due to other 
factors, such as boredom or dissatisfaction with an uneven number of turns for each 
player.  In Study 1, a truly nonsocial Control Condition that was perceptually similar to 
  19
the social condition with “real” co-players was created by using walls in place of the 
animated co-players.   
I also assessed participants’ self-reports of real life prosocial behavior, empathy, 
emotional reactions to the Cyberball task, social desirability, tendency to 
anthropomorphize, and traits related to Autism, including social skills, communication, 
imagination, attention switching, and attention to detail.  The self-reported real life 
prosocial behavior, empathy, social skills, and reactions to the Cyberball task measures 
were included to determine if prosocial responses on the adapted Cyberball task are 
related to real life prosocial behavior and empathy.  The reactions to the Cyberball task, 
the anthropomorphism measure, and the attention to detail subscale of the Autism 
Quotient were included to help clarify individual differences in participants’ behavior 
during the Cyberball task.  For example, previous research has shown that children and 
adults often attribute mental states and social intentions to non-human agents (i.e., 
anthropomorphism) (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010).  Therefore, it is possible that 
some participants will interpret the nonsocial Control Condition as involving entities that 
care about being excluded.  For this reason, it will be important to see if participants’ 
reactions to each condition of the Cyberball game differ and if individual differences in 
anthropomorphism relate to individual differences in prosocial behavior during the 
nonsocial Control Condition.  It is also possible that participants will attempt to even out 
the passes during both conditions, not because they want to include an excluded co-player 
or wall, but rather to systematize the passes.  Previous research has suggested that the 
tendency to systematize – to notice structure and rules – is related to the capacity to pay 
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attention to detail (Baron-Cohen, 2010); therefore, a measure of individual differences in 
participants’ attention to detail was also included. 
Hypotheses.  It was hypothesized that the Cyberball task would elicit prosocial 
behavior in the social condition involving social interactions with real people, but not the 
nonsocial control condition.  Specifically, participants would attempt to include (i.e., pass 
the ball more often to) the excluded co-player in the Real Condition more often than 
passing the ball to the excluded wall in the Control Condition.  It was also hypothesized 
that individual differences in prosocial behavior during the Cyberball task would be 
related to individual differences in self-reports of real life prosocial behavior, empathy, 
and social skills (controlling for social desirability), as well as anthropomorphism, and 
attention to detail.  Specifically, it was expected that participants’ attempts to include the 
excluded player in the Real Condition would be related to individual differences in 
everyday prosocial behavior, empathy, and social skills; whereas participants’ attempts to 
even out the passes to the excluded wall were expected to be related to individual 
differences in self-reports of anthropomorphism; attempts to include the excluded co-
player/wall in both conditions might relate to individual differences in attention to detail. 
Method 
Participants.  Participants were 60 college students recruited from the University 
of Oregon Psychology Department’s Human Subject’s Pool (36 females and 24 males; 
Mage = 19.87, SDage = 4.46; 18 to 52 years).  The majority of participants identified 
themselves as White (n = 37; 61.7%); there were nine participants who identified 
themselves as Asian, four as a mix of ethnicities/races, three as Hispanic, Latino, or 
Spanish, two as Black or African American, two as “other”, and one each as Asian 
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Indian, Pacific Islander, and Middle Eastern.  There were 31 Freshmen, 15 Sophomores, 
5 Juniors, 1 Senior, and 2 Post Baccalaureates.  Participants were compensated with class 
credit.  
Materials. 
Cyberball task.  Participants engaged in two conditions of Cyberball (version 3) 
on a 996 MHz Dell PC with an Intel Pentium III processor and 512 MB of RAM on 
Microsoft Windows XP Professional platform (Version 2002 with Service Pack 3).  In 
one condition, participants believed they were playing with other students (Real 
Condition) and in the other condition, participants bounced the ball around between walls 
(Control Condition); the conditions were counterbalanced across participants.  For each 
condition, Cyberball was set to play with four total locations (the participant, plus three 
co-players or three walls).  The participant was always in the position at the bottom of the 
screen; the co-players in the Real Condition or the walls in the Control Condition were in 
locations at the top of the screen, to the right of the screen, and to the left of the screen - 
see Appendix A.  
Photographs of the participants were taken at the beginning of the behavioral 
session and were then uploaded into the Cyberball program to be used for each condition; 
the participants’ names were also programmed into Cyberball.  In the Real Condition, 
there were black and white animated drawings of people in each of the co-player 
positions that would throw and catch the ball, and next to each animated person were 
photographs and names of other people.  In the location of the participant, there was a 
black and white animated drawing of a hand that would catch and throw the ball above 
the photograph and name of the participant.  The co-players always matched the gender 
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of the participants.  Photographs of the co-players were of students from other 
Universities who gave their permission for their photograph to be used in the study.  
These students’ real names were not used. Instead, the females were given the 
pseudonyms Suzanne, Phoebe, and Melinda and the males were given the pseudonyms 
Randy, Joel, and Kevin.  The location order of the co-players’ pictures was 
counterbalanced.  In the Control Condition, there were black and white drawings of walls 
in each of the three “co-player” positions, and in the bottom position was a black and 
white animated drawing of a hand that would throw and catch the ball, as well as the 
photograph and name of the participant.   
The total number of passes of the ball in each condition was set to 105 and the 
speed of the game was set so that each pass from the co-players or walls ranged from 2 to 
5 seconds (the timing was random).  Each condition was divided into a Baseline portion 
(average of 57.58 passes, SD = 3.46) and an Exclusion portion (average of 47.42 passes, 
SD = 3.46) – this proportion was used so that participants would receive the ball 
approximately an equal number of times during Baseline (M = 14.23, SD = 1.13) and 
Exclusion (M = 14.90, SD = 1.24).  During the Baseline portion of the game, all of the 
co-players (or walls), including the participants, received the ball roughly an equal 
number of times in a randomized order.  After the Baseline portion, the Exclusion portion 
of the game began, during which one of the co-players (or walls) did not receive the ball 
from the other two co-players (or walls); the only time that the excluded co-player or wall 
received the ball was if the participants chose to pass it there.  The two co-players (or 
walls) that were excluding the other co-player (or wall) tossed the ball to each other or to 
the participants roughly an equal number of times, in a randomized order.  If the excluded 
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co-player (or wall) received the ball from the participants, it tossed the ball to the other 
co-players (or walls) or the participant in a randomized order.  The location of the co-
player (or wall) that was excluded was counterbalanced across participants.   
When participants received the ball, they chose where to pass it by pressing the 1 
(to pass to the co-player or wall on the left of the screen), 2 (to pass to the co-player or 
the wall at the top of the screen) or 3 (to pass to the co-player or wall on the right of the 
screen) key on a numeric computer keyboard.  An example of the layout used for each 
condition of Cyberball was reproduced and printed on a sheet of paper to illustrate the 
game for participants.   
Self-report measures.  In addition to the Cyberball behavioral assessment of 
prosocial behavior, participants were asked to fill out questionnaires to assess real life 
empathy, prosocial behavior, social skills, anthropomorphism, social desirability, 
demographic information, reactions to the Cyberball behavioral task, and whether the 
manipulation used in the Cyberball behavioral task was effective.  Each of these 
measures is described in turn. 
Real life empathy.  Real life empathy was measured using the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI), which is the most widely used adult empathy assessment (Davis, 
1983; Litvack-Miller, McDougall, & Romney, 1997).  It consists of 28 items and assesses 
four components of real life empathy: (a) Empathic Concern – experiencing sympathy 
and related positive emotions oriented towards others (e.g., “I feel sad when I see a lonely 
stranger in a group”); (b) Personal Distress - experiencing anxiety and related negative 
self-oriented emotions in empathy-arousing situations (e.g., “It occasionally embarrasses 
me when someone tells me their problems”); (c) Perspective Taking - adopting the point 
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of view of another individual (e.g., “I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement 
before I make a decision”); and (d) Fantasy - respond with empathy towards the emotions 
or actions of fictitious characters (e.g., “I really get involved with the feelings of the 
characters in a novel”).  Participants answered the questions using a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (Does not describe me at all) to 5 (Describes me very well).  Nine of the 
items were reverse scored.  The IRI was scored by averaging the items for each of the 5 
subscales (for the Total score, all of the items were averaged); possible scores could 
range from 1 to 5.   
Real life prosocial behavior.  Real life prosocial behavior was measured using 
Caprara, Steca, Zelli, & Capanna’s (2005) Prosocialness Scale for Adults, which is a 
validated scale, consisting of 16 items that assesses adults rating of their own sharing, 
helping, taking care of, and feeling empathic towards others (e.g., “I try to help others”).  
Participants answered each question on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never or 
almost never true) to 5 (almost always or always true).  The Prosocialness Scale for 
Adults was scored by averaging all of the items.  Possible scores could range from 1 to 5.   
Autism Quotient. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley’s 
(2001) Autism Quotient (AQ) questionnaire, which consists of 50 items, was used to 
measure five components: (a) social skills (e.g., “I find it easy to work out what someone 
is thinking or feeling just by looking at their face”); (b) attention switching (e.g., “If there 
is an interruption, I can switch back to what I was doing very quickly”); (c) attention to 
detail (e.g., “I notice patterns in things all the time”); (d) communication (e.g., “In a 
social group, I can easily keep track of several different people’s conversations”); and (e) 
imagination (e.g., “When I’m reading a story, I can easily imagine what the characters 
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might look like”).  Participants responded by indicating whether they definitely agreed, 
slightly agreed, slightly disagreed, or definitely disagreed with each item.  The AQ was 
scored by summing the items for each of the 5 subscales; possible scores could range 
from 1 to 10. 
Anthropomorphism.  Anthropomorphism is the tendency to attribute human 
characteristics to non-human agents.  For example, some adults attribute mental states 
and social intentionality to the movements of geometric shapes (e.g., Abell, Happe, & 
Frith, 2000).  Although the wall locations themselves were not moving in the Cyberball 
Control Condition, the ball bounced between, which might have been interpreted as 
intentional actions.  Therefore, the Individual Differences in Anthropomorphism 
Questionnaire (IDAQ; Waytz et al., 2010) was included.  This is a questionnaire that 
consists of 30 items (e.g., “To what extent does a television set experience emotions.”) 
that participants answered using a 10-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 
(very much).  The IDAQ was scored by summing the items related to anthropomorphism 
(i.e., not including the filler items); possible scores could range from 1 to 150.   
Social desirability.  Social desirability is a bias in self-report questionnaires due to 
the tendency for participants to respond in ways in which they believe will be favorable 
to others (i.e., by over-reporting positive behavior and/or under-reporting negative 
behavior).   Because empathy and prosocial behavior are socially desirable traits, the 
Reynolds Short Form A of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Reynolds, 
1982) was included.  This questionnaire consists of 11 True/False items (e.g., “I am 
sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me”).  The Social Desirability Scale was 
scored by averaging the total items; possible scores could range from 0 to 1.   
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Demographic information.  Basic demographic information, including gender, 
age, ethnicity, religion, education level, marital status, occupation, etc. was measured 
using a questionnaire developed for this study.  These data were collected in order to 
describe the sample and, with the exception of gender, were not evaluated in relation to 
performance on Cyberball. 
Reactions to Cyberball and manipulation check.  Participants were asked about 
their reactions to each condition of the Cyberball task after completing the entire game 
using an 8-item questionnaire to measure different aspects of the Cyberball game: (1) 
whether participants noticed that a co-player/wall was excluded from the game (e.g., 
“When I was doing the calibration check, I thought all of the walls were included 
equally”), (2) whether participants had a preference for one of the co-players/walls (e.g., 
“When I was playing with the other students, I had a favorite player”), (3) if participants 
had an empathic reaction to the real co-player being excluded (e.g., “When I was playing 
with the other students, I thought one of the players was treated unfairly”).  Participants 
answered the questions with a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never or almost never 
true) to 5 (almost always or always true); some of the questions had open-ended follow-
up questions for participants to elaborate about their previous response (see Appendix B).   
Additionally, participants were asked about the extent to which they believed the 
deception used in the Cyberball game with a 7-item questionnaire (e.g., “Did you think 
anything was unusual about the other students?” “To what extent did you think you were 
playing with real students?”).  Five of the questions were yes-no questions with an 
additional follow-up question if participants answered yes; the two remaining questions 
were answered on a percentage scale from 0% to 100% (see Appendix C). 
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Procedure.  Participants completed the questionnaires to measure real life 
empathy, prosocial behavior, social skills, anthropomorphism, and social desirability 
online prior to participating in the behavioral Cyberball task.  It took participants 
approximately 30 minutes to complete these questionnaires online.  Forty-one 
participants completed the questionnaires as part of a general survey, which was a 
prerequisite for participating in the behavioral Cyberball portion of the study.  These 
participants were unaware that their questionnaire data would be connected to their 
participation in the Cyberball task until after they participated in the behavioral portion of 
the study.  A different method was used for recruiting the last 19 participants.  For this 
method, nineteen participants signed up for the study with knowledge that it had two 
components (i.e., an online component that consisted of the questionnaires and a 
behavioral component); therefore, these participants were aware that their questionnaire 
data would be connected to data from the behavioral session before they participated in 
the behavioral portion of the study.  In preliminary analyses, I found no differences 
between participants who were aware that their questionnaire data would be connected to 
their data from the behavioral session before and after they participated in the behavioral 
portion of the study; therefore, the data for all participants were combined.  
Upon arrival to the lab, participants were introduced to two experimenters 
(Experimenter 1 was in charge of the participant and Experimenter 2 was in charge of 
setting up the computer).  Then they were asked to read and sign the consent form and 
were given the cover story for the Real Condition (i.e., that they would be playing a 
virtual ball-tossing game with three people who would be connected over the Internet).  
In past research with adults, this cover story was accepted and the participants were 
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convinced that the co-players were real people (Williams et al., 2000).  The following 
script was used: 
It was really important that we were able to schedule you for this time 
today because we are coordinating with other participants at other schools 
from around the country – it’s been a bit of a scheduling nightmare, but it 
worked out today just fine.  I’m really glad you could come in during this 
time!  The other schools that we are collaborating on this study with are 
CU Boulder, UCLA, and UW up in Seattle.  You’ll see pictures of the 
students from these schools who will be playing the game with you.  
They’ll also get to see a picture of you.  You probably noticed in the 
consent form that we asked your permission to take your picture – that’s 
why.  Did you say that’s ok on the consent form? [Experimenter 1 checked 
the consent form to see if the participant signed ‘yes’ in the photo consent 
section at end of consent form.]  Your picture will only be used for this 
one game and the only people who will see it are the researchers in this lab 
and in the labs at the other universities, and participants playing the game 
with you.  Your first name will be connected with your photo, but not your 
last name or any other identifying info about you.  We will delete the 
picture of you after your participation today.  Is it still okay with you that 
we take your picture? 
Experimenter 2 then took the participants’ photographs with a digital camera and 
went into the testing room to upload them into the Cyberball program.  Before 
Experimenter 2 went into the testing room, Experimenter 1 asked Experimenter 2 to 
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“double check that the other sites are ready because the last time I looked, not all 
participants were there yet.”  While Experimenter 2 set up the Cyberball program, 
Experimenter 1 explained the cover story for the Control Condition by saying to 
participants: 
Because you’ll be connected with the other participants over the Internet, 
it is important for us to get a calibration of each participant’s reaction time 
– this is because Internet connections vary and sometimes there is a lag 
time.  We need to calibrate participants’ reaction times with the Internet 
connections at each site, so we can get an accurate measure for each 
person.  In order to calibrate your reaction time with the Internet 
connection, we need you to play a version of the ball tossing game where 
you will be playing with nobody at all.  It’s just a calibration check of your 
reaction time.   
 
Participants were then given the demographic questionnaire while waiting for 
Experimenter 2 to set up the Cyberball game.  During this time, Experimenter 2 
continued the cover story for the Real Condition by calling “Dave,” one of the other 
researchers with whom we were supposedly collaborating, to ask if the other participants 
were ready.  This conversation took place in a room adjacent to where the participants 
and Experimenter 1 were sitting, but Experimenter 2 spoke loudly, so that participants 
could easily hear the conversation.  If the Real Condition was first, “Dave” told 
Experimenter 2 that the other participants were ready, but if the Control Condition was 
first, “Dave” told Experimenter 2 that the other participants were not ready yet and that 
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the calibration check should be done while they were waiting.  After the call to “Dave,” 
Experimenter 2 returned to the waiting room to tell Experimenter 1 and the participants 
the names of the other participants and whether they would be playing with the other 
participants first or whether they would be completing the calibration check first.   
 Experimenter 1 took the participants into the testing room and gave them 
instructions for how to play the Cyberball game using the instructions in Appendix D 
depending on which condition came first. While participants played the game, both 
Experimenters stayed in the waiting room.  After the participants completed the first 
condition of Cyberball, Experimenter 1 took them back into the waiting room while 
Experimenter 2 set up the Cyberball program for condition 2.  Once the computer was 
ready for condition 2, Experimenter 1 took the participants back into the testing room and 
gave them instructions for condition 2 (i.e., the condition that was not used during 
condition 1).  During condition 2, both Experimenters stayed in the waiting room.   
Including the cover stories and set-up time, it took approximately 40 minutes to 
complete the Cyberball task.  After the participants were finished with condition 2 of 
Cyberball, Experimenter 1 returned to the testing room to give them the reaction to 
Cyberball questionnaire followed by the manipulation check questionnaire.  It took 
participants approximately 10 minutes to complete these questionnaires.  Because 
deception was used for the Cyberball task, participants were fully debriefed following 
completion of the questionnaires. 
Results 
Cyberball.  The Cyberball game was divided into the Baseline period (i.e., from 
the beginning of the game until the onset of a co-player/wall being excluded) and the 
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Exclusion period (i.e., from the onset of a co-player/wall being excluded until the end of 
the game).  In addition, the Baseline and Exclusion periods were further sub-divided for 
comparisons between the first and second halves of both the Baseline and Exclusion 
portions of the game.  I compared the first and second half of the Inclusion period 
because participants might have needed time to become accustomed to the game during 
the Baseline period.  I compared the first and second half of the Exclusion period because 
there might have been a latency in noticing that someone was left out of the game.  The 
percentage of passes from the participant to the excluded player/wall was calculated for 
each half of each period of the game (the number of times the participant passed the ball 
to the excluded player/wall divided by the total number of passes to all three 
players/walls, multiplied by 100).   
There were no significant differences between the percentage of passes to the 
player/wall to be excluded during the first half of the Baseline period and the second half 
of the Baseline period for either the Real Condition, t (59) = .063, p = .950, or the Control 
Condition, t (59) = -.299, p = .766 (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations).  
Likewise, there were no significant differences between the percentage of passes to the 
excluded player/wall during the first half of the Exclusion period and the second half of 
the Exclusion period for either the Real Condition, t (59) = -.068, p = .946, or the Control 
Condition, t (59) = -.209, p = .835 (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations).  
Therefore, the entire Baseline and entire Exclusion periods for both the Real and Control 
Conditions were used in the analyses.   
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Percentage of Passes to the 
Excluded Co-Player/Wall During the First and Second Half of the Baseline and 
Exclusion Periods for the Real and Control Conditions 
 
 First half 
 
Second half 
 
Baseline 
 
Real 32.36 (8.88) 32.24 (10.74) 
Control 34.91 (10.26) 35.53 (12.50) 
 
Exclusion 
 
Real 
 
38.99 (11.70)* 
 
39.12 (15.05)** 
Control 41.21 (12.13)* 
 
41.70 (15.37)* 
*Significantly higher than chance at p < .001 
**Significantly higher than chance at p < .005 
 
 
The percentage of passes from the participant to the excluded player/wall was 
calculated for each entire period of the game [the number of times the participant passed 
the ball to the excluded player/wall divided by the total number of passes to all three 
players/walls, multiplied by 100].  These percentages were used to create two change 
scores that were used as an index of the percent increase of passes to the excluded player 
from Baseline to Exclusion (percentage of passes to the excluded player/wall during 
Exclusion minus the percentage of passes to the excluded player/wall during Baseline).  
Positive change scores (increase in the percent of passes from Baseline to Exclusion) 
were interpreted as attempts to include the excluded player/wall.  Negative change scores 
(decrease in the percent of passes from Baseline to Exclusion) were interpreted as 
attempts to exclude the excluded player/wall, a pattern that might indicate the participant 
was attempting to affiliate with the two included players/walls (answers from the 
reactions to Cyberball items in the questionnaire were used to help identify this 
possibility).  Change scores near zero were interpreted as no attempt to either exclude or 
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include the excluded player/wall, a pattern that might indicate that the participant did not 
notice that one of the players/walls was being excluded (again, answers from the 
reactions to Cyberball items in the questionnaire were used to help identify this 
possibility).  
A 2 X 2 mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted with condition (Real vs. 
Control) as a within-subjects factor and order (Real Condition first and Control Condition 
second vs. Control Condition first and Real Condition second) as a between-subjects 
factor (see Table 2 for means, standard deviations, and minimum and maximum scores); 
change scores were the dependent variable.  There was no significant main effect of 
condition, F (1, 58)  = .056, p = .814, but there was a significant main effect of order, F 
(1, 58) = 4.44, p = .039, partial η2 = .071; participants who completed the Real Condition 
first had significantly higher change scores compared to participants who completed the 
Control Condition first, regardless of condition.  There was also a marginally significant 
interaction between condition and order, F (1, 58) = 3.83, p = .055, partial η2 = .062.  For 
the Control Condition, there were no differences between participants who completed the 
Real or Control Condition first, t (58) = .199, p = .843, but for the Real Condition, 
participants who completed the Real Condition first had higher change scores than those 
who completed the Control Condition first, t (58) = 2.51, p = .015, Cohen’s d = .76 (see 
Figure 1). 
An independent samples t-test showed a significant difference between the change 
scores for the Real Condition for the 30 participants who completed the Real Condition 
first (M = 11.27, SD = 11.00) and the change scores for the Control Condition for the 30 
participants who completed the Control Condition first (M = 5.64, SD = 9.85), t (58) =  
  
2.09, p = .041, Cohen’s d = .54 (see Figure 1 
Condition to the bar on the right for the Control Condition).
 
Table 2 
Means, Standard Deviations (in Parentheses), and Minimum and Maximum Scores of 
Change Scores for Real and Control Conditions by Condition Order (Within Subjects; N 
= 60) 
 
Condition order 
 
Real first and 
Control second 
11.27 (11.00)
Min = 
Control first and 
Real second 
1.75 (13.96)
Min = -
Total 6.51 (13.35)
Min = -
 
 
Figure 1.  Mean Change Scores by Condition and Condition Order.
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– comparing the bar on the left for the Real 
 
Real Control 
 
-7.14; Max = 
38.10 
 
6.31 (15.64) 
Min = -36.67; Max = 
26.92 
8.79 (SE = 1.7)
Min = 
= 38.10
 
46.67; Max = 
26.67 
 
5.64 (9.85) 
Min = -11.54; Max = 
29.17 
3.70 (SE = 1.7)
Min = 
= 29.17
 
46.67; Max = 
38.10 
5.98 (12.96) 
Min = -36.67; Max = 
29.17 
 
Total 
 
-36.67; Max 
 
 
-46.67; Max 
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Individual differences.  Gender was unrelated to change scores, t (58) = -.825, p 
= .413.  Due to experimenter error, it was not possible to connect the online questionnaire 
data to the data from the behavioral session for two of the participants; therefore, there 
are self-report data for 58 participants.  See Table 3 for the descriptive statistics (i.e., 
Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum scores, number of items, and 
Cronbach’s Alpha) for these online questionnaires.  Cyberball change scores for the Real 
Condition for the 30 participants who completed the Real Condition first were not 
significantly correlated with any of the individual differences measures from the online 
questionnaires after controlling for social desirability (ps > .10) (see Table 4 for 
correlations).   
Change scores for the Control Condition for the 30 participants who completed 
the Control Condition first were significantly positively correlated with Autism Quotient 
Attention to Detail scores such that higher change scores were associated with higher 
Attention to Detail scores, r (29) = .533, p = .003.  Because 13 correlations were 
conducted, a Bonferroni correction would require a significance level of .0038; therefore, 
the correlation between Control Condition change scores and Attention to Detail scores 
was considered significant.  The correlation remained marginally significant after 
controlling for social desirability, r (24) = .49, p = .008.  There were no other significant 
correlations between change scores for the Control Condition and individual differences 
from the questionnaires (see Table 4 for correlations). 
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Table 3 
Mean, Standard Deviations (in Parentheses), Minimum and Maximum Scores, Number of 
Items, and Cronbach’s Alphas for Real Life Empathy, Prosocial Behavior, Autism 
Quotient, Anthropomorphism, and Social Desirability 
 
Questionnaire Subscale Number of 
items 
 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min - Max 
scores 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
 
 
 
 
 
Interpersonal 
Reactivity 
Index 
Fantasy 
 
7 3.39 (.66) 2 – 4.71 .761 
Perspective 
Taking 
 
7 3.36 (.56) 1.71 – 
4.43 
.711 
Empathic 
Concern 
 
7 3.70 (.57) 2.14 – 
4.86 
.797 
Personal 
Distress 
 
7 2.80 (.62) 1.00 – 
4.29 
.737 
Total 
 
28 3.31 (.38) 2.59 – 
4.14 
.791 
Prosocialness Scale for Adults 
 
16 3.72 (.57) 2.25 – 
5.00 
.901 
 
 
 
 
Autism 
Quotient 
Social Skills 
 
10 2.10 (1.76) .00 – 6.00 .535 
Attention 
Switching 
 
10 4.88 (2.24) .00 – 9.00 .619 
Attention to 
Detail 
 
10 5.31 (2.17) 1.00 – 
10.00 
.582 
Communication 
 
10 2.16 (1.58) .00 – 6.00 .358 
Imagination 
 
10 2.12 (1.60) .00 – 6.00 .398 
Individual Differences in 
Anthropomorphism 
Questionnaire 
 
15 58.55 
(23.61) 
3.00 – 
108.00 
.833 
Social Desirability Scale 
 
11 .42 (.22) .00 - .91 .669 
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Table 4 
Correlations Between Real and Control Condition Change Scores, Real Life Empathy, 
Prosocial Behavior, Autism Quotient, and Anthropomorphism Controlling for Social 
Desirability for Participants who Completed the Real Condition First and Participants 
who Completed the Control Condition First 
 
Questionnaire Subscale Real Condition 
Change Scores for 
Participants who 
Completed the 
Real Condition 
First 
(N = 28) 
 
Control Condition 
Change Scores for 
Participants who 
Completed the 
Control Condition 
First 
(N = 28) 
 
 
 
 
 
Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index 
Fantasy 
 
-.018 .198 
Perspective Taking 
 
.010 .227 
Empathic Concern 
 
.258 .136 
Personal Distress 
 
.321 -.163 
Total 
 
.225 .128 
Prosocialness Scale for Adults 
 
.076 .094 
 
 
 
 
Autism Quotient 
Social Skills 
 
-.068 -.185 
Attention Switching 
 
-.238 -.117 
Attention to Detail 
 
-.141 .490* 
Communication 
 
-.291 -.125 
Imagination 
 
-.218 .050 
Individual Differences in 
Anthropomorphism Questionnaire 
 
-.159 -.234 
*p = .008 
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Participants’ answers to the Cyberball Questionnaire were coded for whether they 
noticed that one of the players was left out of the game based on their responses to three 
questions: “When I was playing with the other students, I thought everyone got the ball 
the same amount” (reverse scored), “When I was playing with the other students, I 
thought one of the players was treated unfairly,” and “When I was playing with the other 
students, I threw the ball to one player most of the time.”  If participants had a score of 
three or higher on the Likert scale portion of the question or gave any indication that they 
thought that there was inequality in the number of throws to each co-player, they were 
coded as noticing that someone was excluded.  Using these criteria, there were 35 
(58.3%) participants who noticed that one of the players was left out of the game and 25 
(41.7%) who did not notice.  There were no differences between the people who noticed 
that someone was excluded and those who did not when comparing the change scores for 
the Real Condition of the participants who completed the Real Condition first to the 
change scores for the Control Condition of the participants who completed the Control 
Condition first, F (1, 56) = .014, p = .905. 
Fewer participants noticed that one of the walls was left out of the game 
compared to people who noticed that one of the co-players was excluded.  Part of the 
reason for not noticing that one of the walls was excluded might have been that 
participants did not pay attention because they did not care about the equality of passes to 
the walls; in fact, 16 (26.7%) participants explicitly pointed out that they did not pay 
attention to or did not care about the equality of passes during the Control Condition.  
Participants’ answers to the Cyberball Questionnaire were coded for whether they noticed 
that one of the walls was left out of the game based on their responses to three questions: 
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“When I was doing the calibration check, I thought that one of the walls did NOT get the 
ball as often as the other walls did,” “When I was doing the calibration check, I thought 
all of the walls were included equally” (reverse scored), and “When I was doing the 
calibration check, I threw the ball to all of the walls” (reverse scored).  If participants had 
a score of three or higher on the Likert scale portion of the question or gave any 
indication that they thought that there was inequality in the number of throws to each 
wall, they were coded as noticing that a wall was excluded.  There were 15 (25%) 
participants who noticed that one of the walls was left out of the game (10 of these 
participants also noticed that someone was left out of the Real Condition) and 45 (75%) 
participants who did not notice (20 of these participants also did not notice that someone 
was left out of the Real Condition).  There were no differences between the people who 
noticed that a wall was excluded and those who did not when comparing the change 
scores for the Real Condition of the participants who completed the Real Condition first 
to the change scores for the Control Condition of the participants who completed the 
Control Condition first, F (1, 56) = .093, p = .762. 
Of the 60 participants, 59 gave no indication that they were skeptical about the 
cover story in response to the first five non-leading questions on the Manipulation Check 
questionnaire; however, one participant wrote, “but now, maybe the people were 
controlled by the computer!  Their pictures were taken perfectly compared to mine,” 
which indicated that he or she had thought about the possibility of deception after 
participating in the Cyberball task.  Participants’ responses on the Manipulation Check 
questionnaire were coded for whether they believed the cover story or not.  Participants 
who answered 50% or lower to the leading question, “to what extent did you think you 
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were playing with real students?” were coded as skeptics (n = 15; 25%); participants who 
answered higher than 50% to this question were coded as believers (n = 45; 75%).  There 
was a significant interaction between condition (within-subjects) and whether participants 
were skeptics or believers (between-subjects), F (1, 56) = 4.69, p = .035, partial η2 = 
.077.  Believers had higher change scores in the Real Condition (M = 8.84, SD = 11.64) 
compared to the Control Condition (M = 4.77, SD = 12.93), while skeptics had higher 
change scores in the Control Condition (M = 9.59, SD = 12.81) compared to the Real 
Condition (M = -.48, SD = 15.99).  There were no differences between skeptics and 
believers when comparing the change scores for the Real Condition of the participants 
who completed the Real Condition first to the change scores for the Control Condition of 
the participants who completed the Control Condition first, F (1, 56) = 1.16, p = .286.  
There were also no differences between skeptics and believers on any of the individual 
differences measures (ps > .10). 
Discussion 
The hypothesis that participants would attempt to include excluded real co-players 
more often than excluded walls was supported by the comparison of the Real and Control 
Conditions for participants who completed these conditions first.  Participants who 
completed the Real Condition first threw the ball more to the excluded player than 
participants who completed the Control Condition first threw the ball to the excluded 
wall.  This result suggests that participants make more of an effort to help an excluded 
person than they do to evening out the passes to an excluded wall.  
There were significant order effects in this experiment.  Participants who 
completed the Real Condition first threw the ball more to the excluded person/wall than 
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those who completed the Control Condition first, regardless of condition.  Additionally, 
there was a marginally significant interaction showing that participants who completed 
the Real Condition first threw the ball more to the excluded person than to the excluded 
wall, but there were no differences between the passes to the excluded person and wall 
for participants who completed the Control Condition first.  It seems as if participants’ 
indifference to one of the walls being excluded in the Control Condition carried over into 
the Real Condition for the participants who completed the Control Condition first.  It is 
also possible that participants who completed the Control Condition first became bored 
with the task by the time they played with other students in the Real Condition, which 
decreased their attention. 
It was also hypothesized that attempts to include the excluded co-player might be 
related to self-reports of real life prosocial behavior, empathy, and/or social skills, but 
there was no support for this prediction.  It is possible that there was no relationship 
between prosocial behavior towards the excluded co-player and self-reports of real life 
prosocial behavior, empathy, and social skills because many people did not explicitly 
notice that one of the co-players was left out of the Cyberball game.  Although 58% of 
the participants indicated that they noticed that one of the co-players did not get the ball 
as often as the others, only 8 (13.3% of the entire sample) of these participants explicitly 
pointed out that the correct co-player was excluded; the remaining participants either 
identified the incorrect player as being excluded (6 participants) or did not specifically 
say who they thought was left out of the game (21 participants).  Because so few 
participants correctly noticed that a player was left out of the game, it will be important in 
future research to make the exclusion more obvious.  Although participants must have 
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implicitly noticed that someone was excluded from the game (because there were 
differences between the prosocial behavior during the Real Condition and the Control 
Condition), increasing the salience of the exclusion might amplify the prosocial behavior 
during the Cyberball task.  In Study 2, we lengthened the Exclusion period in the 
Cyberball game to make it more obvious that one of the players was left out of the game.  
This will also be important to do in future studies with adults.  
An additional hypothesis was that attempts to even out the passes to the excluded 
wall might be related to self-reports of anthropomorphism.  I did not find support for this 
hypothesis.  It is possible that individual differences in anthropomorphism were not 
related to attempts to even out the passes to the excluded wall because participants did 
not anthropomorphize the walls.  Previous research has found that people attribute 
causality, intentionality, and animacy to moving shapes (Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000).  
However, the walls in the present study were not moving; rather, a ball was moving 
between them.  In addition, the walls were identical, plain, black and white structures, 
which might have helped to make them be perceived as truly nonsocial entities.   
A final hypothesis was that individual differences in attention to detail might be 
related to participants’ attempts to include the excluded co-player/wall in either 
condition.  There was no association between attention to detail and attempting to pass 
the ball to the excluded co-player in the Real condition, but participants who passed the 
ball more to the excluded wall had higher levels of attention to detail.  This result 
supports previous research that people who score high on the trait of systematizing show 
superior performance on tasks requiring attention to details, such as detecting patterns 
(Billington, Baron-Cohen, & Bor, 2008).  It is interesting that this pattern emerged only 
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for the Control Condition, indicating that the reason why some people attempted to 
increase the number of passes to the excluded wall was in order to maintain a pattern.  
This was not the case for the Real Condition, suggesting that increasing the passes to the 
excluded co-player reflected an effort to help the other person rather than the goal of 
evening out the passes. 
A limitation of the study is that there was a difference between people who 
believed the deception used in the study and those who were skeptical that they were 
playing with real people.  As would be expected, people who believed that they were 
playing with other people attempted to include the excluded co-player more in the Real 
Condition than the excluded wall in the Control Condition.  Unexpectedly, however, 
participants who were skeptical that they were playing with real people threw the ball 
more to the excluded wall in the Control Condition than to the excluded co-player in the 
Real Condition.  It makes sense that the skeptics did not attempt to include the excluded 
co-player because they did not believe they were playing with real people.  However, it is 
unclear why these participants attempted to even out the passes more to the excluded wall 
than to the excluded co-player, especially because there were no other differences 
between skeptics and believers on any of the individual differences measures.  In future 
studies, it will be important to ensure that a higher percentage of participants believe the 
manipulation.  Even though the cover story used in the present study was fairly elaborate 
and proved to be effective for most of the participants, it might be possible to extend it 
further.  For example, participants might be more likely to believe the cover story if they 
had the opportunity to interact with the co-players by using a pretend Internet chat room 
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or by having the participants talk to the participants on the telephone before the Cyberball 
game.  
In conclusion, adults seem to respond differently while playing Cyberball with 
real co-players than they do when they are playing with walls (at least when comparing 
the conditions between groups), suggesting that they are not merely evening out passes in 
the Real Condition, but rather they are attempting to remedy another person’s unfair 
social exclusion.  The next step was to extend this work to children.  Cyberball has not 
been used with children younger than 7-years of age and studies with children have only 
included the Real Condition.  It will interesting to see if children show patterns similar to 
those shown by adults and to see if there are any developmental differences between 5-
year-old and 8-year-old children.  Furthermore, Study 2 includes a Fiction Condition in 
which children play the Cyberball game with novel cartoon characters.  This condition 
was added in order to evaluate the relationship between children’s reactions to real and 
fictional social interactions.  
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CHAPTER III 
STUDY 2 
Introduction 
The results of Study 1 suggest that the Cyberball paradigm might be a useful tool 
for assessing prosocial behavior in adults; a between groups comparison indicated that 
participants responded to the exclusion of a player by increasing their throws to that 
person, but did not respond to the exclusion of a wall.  These results indicate that the 
increase in throws to the excluded player did not reflect a general tendency to even out 
passes among the three locations, but instead suggest that the adult participants made an 
effort to help an excluded co-player.  
Study 2 was designed to extend this research by investigating the development of 
prosocial responses to social exclusion in the Cyberball task with a sample of 5- and 8-
year-old children.  In addition to examining children’s prosocial responses to the social 
exclusion of a person who was believed to be real, children’s responses to the exclusion 
of a fictional character were examined.  Thus, Study 2 included three conditions, Real 
and Control Conditions similar to those in Study 1 and a new Fiction Condition in which 
the Cyberball game was played with novel cartoon characters.  By including this 
condition, it was possible to examine the correspondence between children’s prosocial 
behavior in real and fictional social interactions.  Study 2 also included questionnaire 
and/or interview measures of real life empathy and prosocial behavior, theory of mind, 
pretend play, exposure to fiction in both books and screen-based media (i.e., movies and 
Television), and anthropomorphism.  I included these measures in order to shed light on 
individual differences in behavior on the Cyberball task.    
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Everyday prosocial behavior.  The precursors of prosocial behavior begin early 
in life.  Young infants have emotional reactions to others’ emotions (e.g., they cry when 
another baby cries) (Martin & Clark, 1982; Sagi & Hoffman, 1976), 8-month-olds engage 
in rudimentary prosocial behavior, such as sharing objects (Hay & Rheingold, 1983), and 
12-month-olds often provide positive contact (e.g., a hug) or verbal reassurance in 
reaction to another person’s emotional distress (Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, et al., 1992).  
Prosocial behavior increases throughout the toddler- and preschool-age years as children 
develop the ability to take another person’s perspective (Batson, 1991; Eisenberg et al., 
2007) and further increases into the elementary school years as perspective taking skills 
continue to develop and children have more opportunities for social interactions with 
same-age peers (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998). 
In the present study, children were interviewed using the Berkley Puppet 
Interview format to collect self-report information about their everyday prosocial 
behavior.  This interview technique was designed to be used with children as young as 4-
years and as old as 8-years (Measelle, Ablow, Cowen, & Cowen, 1998).  The Cyberball 
task was used to provide a laboratory procedure for assessing prosocial behavior.  There 
is limited research using this paradigm with children, but in two studies with adolescents, 
participants witnessed another player being excluded (Masten et al., 2010, 2011).  
Adolescents in this study were not participants in the game and so could not rectify the 
exclusion by increasing their throws to the excluded player.  However, they were given 
the opportunity to write a letter to the excluded player.  In another study using a different 
paradigm, 5-year-old children showed behavioral reactions after viewing videos of 
shapes being excluded by other shapes (Over & Carpenter, 2009).  Thus, in Study 2, 5-
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year-olds were recruited for the younger group of children, along with a group of 8 year-
olds. 
Theory of mind and empathy.  Theory of mind, the capacity to understand and 
interpret other people’s behaviors in terms of underlying mental states (such as thoughts, 
feelings, beliefs, intentions, or desires), follows a well-documented developmental 
timetable (Flavell, 1999; Harris, 2007).  Precursors of theory of mind begin in infancy, 
including imitation, joint attention, empathy, and social referencing (i.e., looking to 
another person for cues about how to react to a situation).  Over the next few years, 
children gain the abilities to understand their own and others’ mental states, such as 
desire, belief, and knowledge.  Much research suggests that by the time children are 5-
years-old, they have a well-developed theory of mind.  However, it is not until middle 
childhood that children start to understand that peoples’ interpretations of ambiguous 
situations are influenced by prior beliefs or expectations (Flavell, 1999).  
Several studies have shown a correlation between advanced theory of mind skills 
and higher levels of prosocial behavior (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 2007; Moore, Barresi, & 
Thompson, 1998).  Similarly, empathy has been linked to prosocial behavior; when 
people feel empathy towards another individual, they are more likely to help that person.  
Several studies have found that children with higher empathic skills tend to be more 
prosocial (Eisenberg et al., 2007).  Furthermore, some studies have found that altruism 
increases with age (Zarbatany, Hartmann, & Gelfand, 1985), which has been attributed to 
developmental differences in empathic sensitivity and perspective taking ability.  
Therefore, in Study 2, children’s empathy and theory of mind were assessed to determine 
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if individual differences in these abilities were related to their prosocial behavior during 
Cyberball. 
Involvement in pretend play and fiction.  I was also interested in the possibility 
that involvement and interest in pretend play and fiction might relate to prosocial 
behavior during Cyberball.  There is some empirical evidence to suggest that there are 
associations between children’s pretend play and prosocial behavior.  For example, 
Howes and Matheson (1992) found that children who engaged in more cooperative social 
pretend play than their peers when they were 2-years-old were more prosocial as 
preschoolers (between 3.5- and 5-years).  Fiction exposure has also been linked to 
prosocial behavior.  In a study by Mares and Woodard (2005), being exposed to prosocial 
content on television led to positive behaviors and attitudes (e.g., altruism, positive social 
interactions, reduced stereotyping) in children.  Furthermore, children who frequently 
play videogames with prosocial content engage in more prosocial behavior in real social 
interactions (Gentile et al., 2009).   
Children’s involvement in fiction has been found to be related to theory of mind, 
which could lead to increases in prosocial behavior.  Children who are frequently 
exposed to storybooks and movies have been found to have superior theory of mind skills 
(Mar, Tackett, & Moore, 2010).  In adults, frequent exposure to fictional narrative 
predicted social ability (e.g., empathy, mentalizing, and the ability to understand subtle 
cues in social interactions; Mar et al., 2006).  According to Mar and Oatley (2008), 
fictional narrative is unique because it not only allows for simulation of the real social 
world; it provides in-depth explanations of social interactions and explicit access to 
characters mental states. 
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Role play in which children create and act out the role of a character, affords 
children with a special kind of social experience which could contribute to their 
perspective taking and theory of mind development (Harris, 2000; Taylor & Carlson, 
1997).  There are three types of role play that that differ in the vehicle used for the 
imagined character (Harris, 2000): (1) invisible friends -- invisible creatures, animals, 
characters, or people that the child creates without the use of any tangible props; (2) 
personified objects -- dolls, toys, stuffed animals, or other objects that the child animates 
and onto which the child projects a role, including psychological characteristics (e.g., 
personality); and (3) pretend identities -- the child himself or herself acts as the vehicle 
for the imagined character (i.e., the child impersonates a character, person, or animal).  
Invisible friends and personified objects are both types of imaginary companions.  
Although the preschool period is thought to be the high season of pretend play (Singer & 
Singer, 1990), it is not uncommon for older children and adolescents to engage in role 
play (Seiffge-Krenke, 1997; Taylor, Carlson, Maring, Gerow, & Charley, 2004).  
Therefore, the age groups of 5 years and 8 years were appropriate for investigating the 
relationship between children’s pretend play and prosocial behavior. 
Hypotheses.  The primary goal of the study was to test the hypothesis that the 
Cyberball task would elicit prosocial behavior from children in the Real and Fiction 
Conditions, but not the nonsocial Control Condition.  More specifically, I expected that 
participants would attempt to include (i.e., pass the ball more often to) the excluded real 
co-player (in the Real Condition) and the excluded fictional co-player (in the Fiction 
Condition).  In contrast, I did not expect participants to pass the ball more to the 
“excluded” wall (in the Control Condition).  I also expected that children would behave 
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similarly in the Real and Fiction Conditions (i.e., the increase in passes to the excluded 
real co-player would correlate with the increase in passes to the excluded fictional co-
player and both Conditions would differ from the Control Condition).   
Previous research indicates that prosocial behavior increases with age (Eisenberg 
et al., 2007) and thus, I expected that 8-year-olds would engage in more prosocial 
behavior during the Cyberball task (in both the Real and Fiction Conditions) than the 5-
year-olds.   
Study 2 also provided an opportunity to explore possible relations between a 
range of individual difference measures and prosocial behavior on the Cyberball task. I 
expected that individual differences in empathy, prosocial behavior, and social 
understanding might relate to the likelihood of engaging in prosocial behavior in both the 
Real and Fiction Conditions.  In particular, children with higher self-reports of empathy 
and prosocial behavior and higher parent-reports of theory of mind were expected to 
behave more prosocially towards the real and fictional players.   
I also predicted that engagement in role play and involvement in fiction might 
relate to the correspondence between the Real and Fiction Conditions.  Specifically, 
children who engage in frequent amounts of role play and fiction might engage in more 
prosocial behavior towards the fictional characters, due to their practice thinking about 
the mental states of and empathizing with fictional characters.  And perhaps this practice 
might carry over into their real social interactions; thus, children who were highly 
involved in role play and fiction might also show high levels of prosocial behavior 
towards the real characters.  Consequently, for these children there might be a stronger 
correlation between the prosocial behaviors towards fictional characters (Fiction 
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Condition) and real people (Real Condition) than children who were not as involved and 
interested in role play and fiction.  
Method 
Participants.  The participants were 74 children recruited from birth 
announcements in the local newspaper (37 females and 37 males; 37 5-year-olds, and 37 
8-year-olds).  However, two children did not complete all the tasks and one child asked to 
use the bathroom in the middle of the Cyberball task.  The remaining sample consisted of 
71 children: 35 5-year-olds (18 females and 17 males; Mage = 5 years, 8.2 months, SD = 
2.4 months; ranging from 5 years, 3 months to 6 years, 0 months) and 36 8-year-olds (18 
females and 18 males; Mage = 8 years, 6.5 months, SD = 2.9 months; ranging from 8 
years, 1 month to 9 years, 0 months).   
The majority of participants’ parents identified their children as White (n = 63; 
88.7%); there were five participants identified as a mix of ethnicities/races; one as Asian, 
and one as “other.”  There were 13 (18.3%) only children, 25 (35.2%) children with 1 
sibling, 22 (31%) with 2 siblings, 6 (8.5%) with 3 siblings, 1 (1.4%) with 4 siblings, 3 
(4.2%) with 5 siblings, and 1 (1.4%) with 7 siblings.  Thirty-nine (54.9%) participants 
were in elementary school (5 in 1st grade, 14 in 2nd grade, 19 in 3rd grade, and 1 in 4th 
grade), 16 (22.5%) were in kindergarten, 7 (9.9%) were in preschool, 4 (5.6%) were in 
daycare, and 2 (2.8%) were in other forms of school.  The mean age of the parent who 
accompanied the child to the session (68 mothers and 3 fathers) was 38.9 years (SD = 
5.9%; ranging from 27 to 54 years).  The majority of participants’ parents were married 
(n = 66; 93.0%) and 4 (5.6%) parents were either single, separated, or had some “other” 
type of marital status.  Thirty (42.3%) of participants’ parents had some college or a 2-
  52
year degree, 26 (36.6%) had a bachelor’s degree, 12 (16.9%) had a graduate degree, one 
(1.4%) had a high school degree, and one (1.4%) had some “other” type of educational 
level. (Note that demographic information is missing from one participant because the 
parent did not fill out the Family Information Questionnaire.)  Participants were given 
$10 as compensation for their participation. 
Materials. 
Cyberball task.  Cyberball (version 3) was run on a 996 MHz Dell PC with an 
Intel Pentium III processor and 512 MB of RAM on Microsoft Windows XP Professional 
platform (Version 2002 with Service Pack 3). The participants engaged in three 
conditions: (1) Real Condition in which participants believed they were playing with 
other children; (2) Fiction Condition in which participants played with novel cartoon 
characters; and (3) Control Condition in which participants bounced the ball around 
between walls.  The order of the conditions was counterbalanced across participants.   
For each condition, Cyberball was set to play with four total locations (the 
participant, plus three co-players or three walls).  The participant was always in the 
position at the bottom of the screen; the co-players in the Real and Fiction Conditions or 
the walls in the Control Condition were in locations at the top of the screen, to the right 
of the screen, and to the left of the screen (see Appendix E for examples of the Real, 
Fiction, and Control Conditions). 
A photograph of the participant was taken at the beginning of the behavioral 
session and was then uploaded into the Cyberball program to be used in each condition; 
the participant’s name was also entered to appear below the participant’s photograph in 
Cyberball.  In the Real and Fiction Conditions, there were black and white animated 
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drawings of people in each of the co-player positions that would throw and catch the ball, 
and next to each animated person were photographs and names of other children (in the 
Real Condition) or novel cartoon characters (in the Fiction Condition).  At the bottom of 
the screen above the photograph and name of the participant, there was a black and white 
animated drawing of a hand that would catch and throw the ball. The real and fictional 
co-players always matched the gender of the participant.   
In the Real Condition, the photographs of the co-players were of children from 
other towns whose parents gave their permission for their children’s photograph to be 
used in the study.  These children’s real names were not used.  Instead the females were 
given the pseudonyms Suzanne, Phoebe, and Melinda and the males were given the 
pseudonyms Randy, Joel, and Kevin (these names were chosen to be consistent with 
Study 1).  In the Fiction Condition, the pictures of the co-players were computer-
generated drawings of novel cartoon characters that were created for this study by a local 
artist.  There was a set of female cartoon characters and a set of male cartoon characters 
(see Appendix F).  For both genders, the names of the cartoon characters were Zoony, 
Razzle, and Beamer.  The location of the co-players’ pictures in the Real and Fiction 
conditions were counterbalanced.  In the Control condition, there were black and white 
drawings of walls in each of the three “co-player” positions, and in the position of the 
participant was a black and white animated drawing of a hand that would throw and catch 
the ball, as well as the photograph and name of the participant.   
In each condition, the total number of passes of the ball was set to 96 and the 
speed of the game was set so that each pass from the co-players or walls ranged from 2 to 
5 seconds (the timing was random).  Note that this number of passes is fewer than the 
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number of passes used in Study 1; I reduced the number of passes because in pilot 
testing, a longer version of Cyberball did not maintain children’s attention.  Each 
condition was divided into a Baseline portion (average of 45.91 passes, SD = 3.98) and 
an Exclusion portion (average of 50.09 passes, SD = 3.98).  The greater number of passes 
for the Exclusion period compared to the Baseline period provided participants more of a 
chance to notice the exclusion, but also allowed the participants to receive the ball a 
similar number of times during the Baseline (M = 11.28, SD = 1.31) and Exclusion (M = 
15.92, SD = 1.5) periods. 
During the Baseline portion of the game, all of the co-players (or walls), including 
the participant, received the ball roughly an equal number of times in a randomized order.  
After the Baseline portion, the Exclusion portion of the game began, during which one of 
the co-players (or walls) did not receive the ball from the other two co-players (or walls) 
(i.e., the only time that the excluded co-player or wall received the ball was if the 
participant chose to pass it there).  The two co-players (or walls) that were excluding the 
other co-player (or wall) tossed the ball to each other or to the participant roughly an 
equal number of times, in a randomized order.  If the excluded co-player (or wall) 
received the ball from the participant, it tossed the ball to the other co-players (or walls) 
or the participant in a randomized order.  The location of the co-player (or wall) that was 
excluded was counterbalanced across participants.   
A special button box was created for the children to use to pass the ball to the co-
players (or walls).  A numeric keypad was enclosed in foam board and large buttons were 
created by gluing foam board to the 1, 2, and 3 keys.  Large arrows pointing to the left, 
up, and right were drawn on the buttons.  When the participant received the ball, he or 
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she chose where to pass it by pressing the left arrow (to pass to the co-player or wall on 
the left of the screen), up arrow (to pass to the co-player or the wall at the top of the 
screen) or right arrow (to pass to the co-player or wall on the right of the screen).  An 
example of the layout used for each run of Cyberball was reproduced and printed on a 
sheet of paper to illustrate the game for participants.  For 5 participants, there were minor 
malfunctions with the button box (e.g., one of the arrows broke off in the middle of a run, 
so the child had to press what was left on the key of the broken arrow; two of the arrows 
stuck together resulting in a couple of passes going to a different player than intended).  
However, there were no significant differences between the patterns of results for the 
children who had problems with the button box and those who did not; therefore data 
from these 5 participants were included in all of the analyses. 
Individual difference measures.  In addition to the Cyberball behavioral 
assessment of prosocial behavior, individual differences in children’s reactions to 
Cyberball, real life empathy, prosocial behavior, anthropomorphism, social understanding 
(i.e., theory of mind), pretend play, and exposure to fiction were measured.  Each of these 
will be discussed in turn. 
Reactions to Cyberball, real life empathy, prosocial behavior, and 
anthropomorphism – child tasks.  The Berkeley Puppet Interview (BPI) was used to 
assess children’s reactions to the Cyberball behavioral task, real life empathy, prosocial 
behavior, and anthropomorphism.  The BPI is a widely used and validated technique for 
assessing young children’s perceptions of themselves and their environments (Measelle et 
al., 1998).  Children engaged in a dialog with two puppy-dog puppets (Iggy and Ziggy); 
each of the puppets provided a statement about itself (e.g., Iggy: “I try hard to be a good 
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friend to other kids”, Ziggy: “I don’t try hard to be a good friend to other kids.  How 
about you?”), and then the child responded about himself or herself.  The BPI consisted 
of items to measure children’s reactions (including empathic reactions) to the Cyberball 
procedure and whether they believed the deception (see Appendix G), as well as items 
about real life empathy adapted from Bryant’s (1982) Index of Empathy for Children and 
Adolescents, the original BPI prosocial behavior subscale, and items about 
anthropomorphism (Tahiroglu, 2012).  Children’s responses to the BPI were coded by 
two independent coders for all of the participants (92.1% reliability); a third coder 
resolved disagreements.  Each response was coded on a seven-point scale depending on 
which statement children said was most like them (according to the BPI coding criteria).   
Each of the items from the reactions to Cyberball subscale (for all three 
conditions of the Cyberball game) was designed to measure different aspects of the 
Cyberball game: (1) whether participants noticed that a co-player/wall was excluded from 
the game (1 item for each condition; e.g., Ziggy:  “When I was playing with the kids, I 
thought one of the kids did not get the ball very much.”  Iggy: “I thought everyone got 
the ball the same amount.  What did you think?”), (2) whether participants had a 
preference for one of the co-players/walls (2 items for each condition; e.g., Iggy: “When I 
was playing with the walls, I had a favorite wall.”  Ziggy: “I didn’t have a favorite wall.  
How about you?”), (3) if participants had an empathic reaction to the real and/or fictional 
co-players being excluded (2 items for the Real and Fiction Conditions; e.g., Ziggy: 
“When I was playing with the characters, I felt bad for one of the characters.”  Iggy: “I 
didn’t feel bad for any of the characters.  How about you?”), and (4) if participants 
believed the deception used in the task (1 item for the Real Condition; e.g., Iggy: “When 
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I was playing the ball tossing game with the kids, I thought the players were real kids 
playing the game on the Internet.” Ziggy: “I didn’t think the players were real kids 
playing the game on the Internet.  How about you?”).   
Scores for (1) favoring the co-player/wall and (2) feeling empathy for the fictional 
and real co-player were created by averaging the two items for those subscales.  The 
internal consistencies (Cronbach’s Alpha) for favoring a co-player/wall for each 
condition were very low (Real: α = .485; Fiction: α = .115; Control: α = .091) and there 
were no significant relationships between favoring a co-player/wall and behavior during 
Cyberball (ps > .10); therefore, favoring a co-player/wall will not be discussed further.   
The internal consistencies (Cronbach’s Alpha) for feeling empathy for the 
excluded real (α = .718) and fictional (α = .689) co-players were adequate.  In addition to 
theses scores, children were given scores (based on the average of the items) for (1) the 
real life empathy (14 items; e.g., Iggy: “Seeing a boy/girl who is crying makes me feel 
like crying.”  Ziggy: “Seeing a boy/girl who is crying doesn’t make me feel like crying.  
How about you?”), (2) prosocial behavior (7 items; e.g., Iggy: “When I play games, I 
don’t make sure everyone gets a turn.”  Ziggy: “When I play games, I make sure 
everyone gets a turn.  What about you?”), and (3) anthropomorphism subscales (6 items; 
e.g., Ziggy: “I think trees cannot think about anything.” Iggy: “I think trees can think 
about things; they can think about their birthdays or friends. How about you? What do 
you think?”) based on the average of the items for each subscale.  The internal 
consistencies (Cronbach’s Alpha) for real life empathy (α = .699), prosocial behavior (α 
= .694), and anthropomorphism (α = .696) were adequate.  The anthropomorphism 
subscale will not be discussed further because anthropomorphism scores were unrelated 
  58
to Cyberball change scores and all other individual differences measures (ps > .10); 
furthermore, results from Study 1 with adults suggests that anthropomorphism was 
unrelated to performance during Cyberball. 
Due to technical errors with the video and/or audio recording equipment, there are 
no data from the BPI for 5 of the participants.  Additionally, there were one or two 
missing items (out of 42 total items) for 17 participants due to either technical errors, 
non-compliance, experimenter error, or non-codable responses; if there were missing data 
for any aggregate scores, averages were based on the available data. 
Children’s theory of mind – parent questionnaire.  Parents completed the 
Children’s Social Understanding Scale (CSUS) to assess their children’s theory of mind 
(Tahiroglu, Moses, Carlson, & Sabbagh, 2009).  The questionnaire consists of 42 items 
and measures six components of theory of mind: (1) belief [e.g., “Talks about what 
people think or believe (e.g., “I think it’s raining”; “He thinks it’s bedtime”)”], (2) 
knowledge [e.g., “Can tell you how s/he found out about things (e.g., “Sally told me 
about it”; “I saw it happen at the park”; “I heard it on the radio”)”], (3) perception (e.g., 
“Thinks you can still see an object even if you are looking in the opposite direction” – 
reverse scored), (4) desire [e.g., “Talks about differences in what people like or want 
(e.g., “You like coffee but I like juice”)”], (5) intention (e.g., “Understands when s/he is 
being teased or made fun of”), and (6) emotion (e.g., “Tries to understand the emotions of 
other people (e.g., wants to know why you are crying)”]; each subscale consists of 7 
items.  Questions were answered on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Definitely 
untrue) to 4 (Definitely true), but parents also had the option of answering ‘do not know’ 
for each question. The Children’s Social Understanding Scale was scored by averaging 
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the items of each subscale.  All of the subscales were highly correlated (ps < .001); 
therefore, a composite social understanding score was created by averaging across all of 
the items in the questionnaire.  This total theory of mind score had high internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s α = .901) and will be used in further analyses (instead of the 
separate subscales).  Possible scores could range from 1 to 4. 
Pretend Play Assessment.  The Pretend Play Assessment consisted of a child role 
play interview, a parent role play questionnaire, a pretend phone conversation as a 
behavioral measure of role play, and an action pantomime task as a behavioral measure 
of object substitution ability.  Each of these will be discussed in turn. 
Role play interview – child task. Children were asked about imaginary 
companions in the following way: ‘some friends are real like the kids who live on your 
street, the ones you play with. And some friends are pretend friends.  Pretend friends are 
ones that are make-believe, that you pretend are real.  Do you have a pretend friend?’  
Children who said they had an imaginary companion were asked a series of questions 
about it (e.g., age, whether it was invisible or based on a toy, appearance, what they liked 
to do together, etc).  Then, children were asked about pretend identities: ‘now I’m going 
to ask you about another type of pretending.  Sometimes children like to pretend that they 
are someone else. They like to talk and act like another person or an animal.  Do you 
pretend to be someone else—like another person or an animal?’  If the child said ‘yes’, he 
or she was asked a series of questions about the pretend identity (e.g., ‘when you are 
Lizardman, can you do anything special?’).  
Parent role play questionnaire.  Imaginary companions were described in the 
following way: ‘many children enjoy pretending to interact with someone who is not real.  
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For example, they might talk to an invisible character that they have created or that is 
based on a real person who is not actually present (e.g., a favorite cousin who lives far 
away).  The pretend interactions might also be with a special stuffed animal or doll.  For 
some children, this type of pretend play is frequent and the child is described as having 
an imaginary companion.’  If the parent indicated that the child had an imaginary 
companion, they were asked a series of forced-choice and open-ended questions [e.g., ‘Is 
the imaginary companion completely invisible or is it a toy?’  ‘If the imaginary 
companion is invisible, what do you know about the physical characteristics of the 
imaginary companion (e.g., size, hair color, clothing)?’  ‘If the imaginary companion is a 
toy, please describe the toy.’].   
Pretend identities were described to parents in the following way: ‘many children 
enjoy pretending to be someone else (a person or animal).  For some children this type of 
play goes beyond occasional pretend games of “house” or “doctor.”  For these children, 
the pretend play can be almost like having an alter ego or pretend identity.  They act out a 
particular role on a regular basis.’  If parents indicated that their child engaged in this 
type of play, they were asked a series of forced-choice and open-ended questions [e.g., ‘Is 
the pretend identity a person, animal (what kind?) or something else (please describe)’; 
‘How would you describe the personality and behavior of the pretend identity?’].  The 
information provided by the parent was used to help code whether the child has an 
invisible friend, personified object, and/or pretend identity (as described above).  A 
parent follow-up questionnaire was used after children completed the role play interview 
and parents completed the role play questionnaire to help clarify any inconsistencies 
between the parent- and child-reports. 
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Role play coding.  Children were coded for whether they had invisible friends, 
personified objects, and pretend identities based on the child role play interview and the 
parent role play and follow-up questionnaires.  The criteria for being coded as having an 
invisible friend were: (1) the child and the parent said that the child has (or had) an 
invisible friend and provided a good description of it; the ‘good’ description of the friend 
was required to eliminate cases in which a child reported that he or she had an invisible 
friend, but neither the child nor the parent could remember anything about it, and thus 
answered ‘don’t know’ to many of our questions, or (2) if the child’s parent did not 
corroborate the child’s response, the child’s description of the invisible friend had to be 
particularly detailed; parents sometimes do not know about the presence of imaginary 
companions for older children (Taylor et al., 2004), so this criteria was added to be more 
inclusive of invisible friends for older children. The reliability between two coders for 36 
(50.7%) of the participants for invisible friends was 91.7%; disagreements were resolved 
by discussion. 
The criteria for coding children as having a personified object were similar, with 
one addition: the description of the object had to go beyond the physical appearance to 
include psychological details (e.g., personality, mental states).  This extra criterion helped 
differentiate between transitional objects that were used for comfort (Winnicott, 1953) 
and personified objects that were treated as characters with personalities.  The reliability 
between two coders for 36 (50.7%) of the participants for personified objects was 94.4%; 
disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
For pretend identities, the criteria were similar, with the addition that the 
description had to go beyond a description of a costume to include details about behavior 
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or personality (e.g., flying, being brave).  This extra criterion helped differentiate 
between the enjoyment of wearing a costume and the creation of a character to be 
impersonated.  The reliability between two coders for 36 (50.7%) of the participants for 
pretend identities was 66.7%; disagreements were resolved by discussion.  The low 
reliability between the coders for pretend identities reflects a general difficulty with 
categorizing this type of play that has been encountered in past research.  Most children 
and parents indicate that the children occasionally impersonate a character, which makes 
it difficult to differentiate children who, for example, sometimes pretend to be Batman 
from children who create a distinct, enduring pretend identity that is impersonated on a 
regular basis.  Because the reliability between the two coders for pretend identities was 
substantially lower than the reliability for invisible friends and personified objects, 
pretend identities will not be included in future analyses. 
Pretend phone conversation – child task. The pretend phone conversation task was 
designed as a behavioral assessment of children’s ability to generate a pretend 
conversation with an imaginary partner.  This task is based on past research comparing 
pretend conversations with real and imaginary friends (Taylor, Cartwright, & Carlson, 
1993).  The experimenter asked, ‘Do you have a special friend you like to play with?’  
After the child named a real friend, he or she was asked, ‘Do you know how to use a 
telephone?’  Then, the experimenter gave a toy phone to the child and asked the child to 
pretend to call his or her friend.  The child’s phone call was given a score out of 5, with 
one point each for (1) dialing, (2) holding the phone to his/her ear, (3) listening, (4) 
talking, and (5) generating content beyond stereotyped phrases such as ‘hello’ or ‘how 
are you?’ (e.g., ‘Do you want to come over and have a sleepover or not?’).  Possible 
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scores could range from 0 to 5; the internal consistency for total scores was adequate 
(Cronbach’s α = .774).  The number of words uttered during the pretend conversation 
were also counted.  There are missing data for the total phone task score for one 
participant and for the number of words used during the pretend phone conversation for 
two participants because they could not be coded due to technical errors with the audio 
and/or video recording equipment.  The phone conversations for 35 (49.3%) of the 
participants were coded by a second experimenter with 96.0% reliability; disagreements 
were resolved by discussion. 
Action pantomime – child task. The action pantomime task is a developmentally 
sensitive behavioral measure of object substitution (Overton & Jackson, 1973).  During 
the task, children are asked to perform simple pretend actions requiring tools but are not 
given an object to substitute as the tool.  Therefore, the child had to come up with his or 
her own way of representing the tool.  Younger children typically use his or her hand as 
the tool required for the action (e.g., used a finger as a toothbrush), while older children 
typically pretend to hold an invisible tool, which is a more sophisticated representation of 
the tool instead of relying on a body part to represent the tool.  Children begin to be able 
to use invisible objects earliest (around age 3-years) when they are asked to hold an 
object without performing an action with the pretend object, followed by being able to 
use invisible objects for action sequences that are directed toward the self (e.g., 
pretending to comb one’s own hair) between the ages of 4- and 6- years, then for action 
sequences that are externally directed (e.g., pretending to hit a block with a hammer) 
between the ages of 6- and 8- years (Dick, Overton, & Kovacs, 2005; Overton & Jackson, 
1973).  
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In Study 2, children were asked to perform nine simple pretend actions. Two of 
the actions were to hold an external object that was not provided by the experimenter: 
hold a pencil and hold a knife.  Three of the actions were directed toward the body: brush 
teeth with a toothbrush, put on sunglasses, fan yourself with a fan.  Two of the actions 
were directed toward an external object that was provided by the experimenter: hammer a 
wooden block with a hammer and cut a piece of paper with scissors.  Two of the actions 
were directed toward an external object that was not provided by the experimenter: pour 
water with a pitcher and flip a pancake with a spatula.  For each of the nine actions, the 
experimenter recorded whether children used their hand to represent the tool for the 
action (e.g., used a finger as a toothbrush), or whether they pretended to hold an invisible 
tool.  Children earned a point for each time they pretended to hold an invisible tool; 
possible scores could range from 0 to 9.  The internal consistency for total action 
pantomime scores was relatively low (Cronbach’s α = .466), but this was largely because 
there was low variability in some of the actions, especially the hold actions, which would 
be expected with children of this age.  However, because there was variability in most of 
the items, they were all included in a total action pantomime score.  There is missing data 
for the total action pantomime scores for two participants due to refusal to complete an 
action or misunderstanding the task.  The pretend actions for 35 (49.3%) of the 
participants were coded by a second experimenter with 94.2% reliability; disagreements 
were resolved by discussion. 
 Fiction involvement questionnaire – parent questionnaire.  Parents were asked to 
fill out a questionnaire to measure their own exposure to fictional and nonfictional books 
and their child’s exposure to fictional and nonfictional books, movies, and television 
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shows.  The questionnaire was developed by Mar and colleagues (Mar et al., 2006; Mar 
et al., 2010) and is a variation of the Author Recognition Test (Stanovich & West, 1989), 
which has been used to measure adults’ interest and involvement with reading by using a 
signal detection approach to control for socially desirable responding.  The questionnaire 
presents a list of authors (of adult and children’s books), book titles, movie titles, and 
television show titles and ‘foils’ (i.e., made-up names of authors, books, movies, and 
television shows).  Parents were instructed to identify the names and titles that they 
recognized.  In order to discourage guessing, parents were also told that (for the author 
lists), “some of the names are people who are not writers, so guessing can easily be 
detected” and (for the title lists), “some of the titles are not real movies/shows/books, so 
guessing can easily be detected.” 
To measure parents’ exposure to fiction and nonfiction books (Mar et al., 2006), 
parents completed that Adult Author Recognition checklist, which consisted of 50 names 
divided into 5 genres (e.g., thrillers, romance) of narrative fiction authors (e.g., P. D. 
James), 50 names divided into 5 genres (e.g., science, philosophy) of non-narrative 
expository nonfiction (e.g., Oliver Sacks), and 40 foils (e.g., Aimee Dorr).   
To measure children’s exposure to fiction and nonfiction books, parents 
completed the Children’s Author Recognition checklist and Children’s Title Recognition 
checklist (Mar et al., 2010).  In the Children’s Author Recognition checklist, there were 
70 names of children’s narrative fiction authors (e.g., Eric Carle), 13 names of children’s 
nonfiction authors (e.g., Jill Frankel Hauser), and 32 foils (e.g., Jeanne Brooks).  In the 
Children’s Title Recognition checklist, there were 63 titles of children’s narrative fiction 
books (e.g., We're Going on a Bear Hunt), 12 titles of children’s nonfiction (e.g., One 
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Grain of Rice: A Mathematical Folktale), and 29 foils (e.g., I Hear a Knock at My 
Window).  To measure children’s exposure to fiction in film, parents completed the 
Children’s Film Recognition test (Mar et al., 2010), which consisted of 87 titles of 
children’s fiction films (e.g., Bambi) and 12 foils (e.g., Robert's Last Lollipop).  To 
measure children’s exposure to fiction in Television, parents completed the Children’s 
Television Recognition test (Mar et al., 2010), which consisted of 68 titles of children’s 
fiction television shows (e.g., The Adventures of Jimmy Neutron: Boy Genius) and 15 
foils (e.g., Café Creative). 
Each subscale [i.e., parents’ exposure to (a) fiction books (Cronbach’s α = .924) 
and (b) nonfiction books (Cronbach’s α = .902); children’s exposure to (c) fiction authors 
(Cronbach’s α = .911) and (d) nonfiction authors (Cronbach’s α = .363); (e) fiction book 
titles (Cronbach’s α = .794) and (f) nonfiction book titles (Cronbach’s α = 421); (g) 
fiction film (Cronbach’s α = .886); and (h) fiction television (Cronbach’s α = .901)] was 
scored by subtracting false positives (when a parent identified a fake name or title) from 
correct hits (checking off actual names or titles).  The internal consistencies were high for 
all subscales except for children’s exposure to nonfiction books (authors and titles), 
which had low internal consistencies.  The average scores for children’s exposure to 
nonfiction books (both authors and titles) was -.35 (SD = 1.3) indicating that parents 
checked off more foils than actual nonfiction authors or titles, resulting in meaningless 
scores; therefore, children’s exposure to nonfiction books will not be included in further 
analyses.   
Two composite scores were created for children: (1) Fiction book exposure, 
which was created by averaging scores on the Children’s Author Recognition checklist 
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and the Children’s Title Recognition checklist for fiction books and (2) Fiction screen-
based media exposure, which was created by averaging scores on the Children’s Film 
Recognition checklist and the Children’s Television Recognition checklist.  For parents, 
three composite scores were created for familiarity with, (1) Fiction authors, (2) 
Nonfiction authors, and (3) overall Books, which was created by averaging scores from 
the Fiction and Nonfiction subscores. 
Demographic information – parent questionnaire.  Basic demographic 
information, including child’s gender, child’s and parent’s age, child and parent’s 
ethnicity, parent’s education level, parent’s marital status, number and age of child’s 
siblings, child’s school, etc. were collected using a questionnaire developed for this 
study.  This information was used to describe the sample and was not evaluated in 
relation to Cyberball behavior or other individual differences measures. 
Procedure.  Participants and their parents were seen for a two-hour long session 
in a university laboratory.  Upon arrival to the lab, participants were introduced to two 
experimenters (Experimenter 1 was in charge of the participant and Experimenter 2 was 
in charge of setting up the computer and giving the questionnaires to the parent).  Parents 
were asked to read and sign the consent form.  Eight-year-old children were given an 
assent form to read and sign; 5-year-old children were told about the study and gave 
verbal consent.  After the parents and children were given a tour of the lab, Experimenter 
1 took the parents into a separate room (Experimenter 2 stayed with the children in the 
waiting room) and explained the deception that would be used with their child; verbal 
consent was obtained from the parents to use the deception in the cover story (no parents 
refused).  Then, the cover story for the Real Condition was told to the children (i.e., that 
  68
they would be playing a virtual ball-tossing game with three other children who would be 
connected over the Internet). The following script was used: 
Today you will be playing a ball tossing game on the computer with other 
children, pretend cartoon characters (like Snoopy), and nobody at all.  The 
other children are kids just like you and they are also playing games in 
other labs just like this one, they are just at other universities in different 
states.  You will get to see each other and see where the other kids are 
throwing the ball because you will all be connected over the Internet.  Do 
you know what the Internet is?  It is a way of talking with people who are 
far away, kind of like a telephone, but using a computer instead.  You 
won’t talk to the other kids, but you will get to see their pictures.  They 
will also see a picture of you!  We would like to take your picture now.  
This picture will be erased after you are done playing the games with us 
today.  Is it okay with you that we take your picture? 
 
Experimenter 2 took the participants’ photographs with a digital camera and went 
into the testing room to upload them into the Cyberball program.  Before Experimenter 2 
went into the testing room, Experimenter 1 asked Experimenter 2, “Will you go get set up 
for the game and double check that the other kids are ready?”  While Experimenter 2 set 
up the Cyberball program, Experimenter 1 played with the children and talked to the 
parents in the waiting room. 
After Cyberball was set up, Experimenter 2 returned to the waiting room and 
handed Experimenter 1 a sticky note with the names of the co-players written on it and 
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said that the game was ready.  Experimenter 2 stayed with the parents in the waiting 
room, where they were given the questionnaires to complete.  After the parents 
completed the questionnaires, they were invited to watch their children complete the 
tasks on a television in a room adjacent to the testing room.  Experimenter 1 took the 
children into the testing room and gave them instructions for how to play the Cyberball 
game using the instructions in Appendix H depending on which condition came first. 
While the children played Cyberball, Experimenter 1 took notes about what the 
children were doing and, if necessary, reminded the children to pay attention to the game, 
pass the ball, only press one button at a time, etc.  After the participants finished the first 
run of Cyberball, Experimenter 1 asked them to sit at a small table in the testing room, 
where they completed the Pretend Phone Conversation and Action Pantomime Task.  
Once those tasks were finished, there was a short break while Experimenter 2 set up the 
next condition of Cyberball; after which, Experimenter 1 took the participants back into 
the testing room and gave the instructions for this condition.  There was no practice 
session given for the second and third conditions because children were already familiar 
with the Cyberball game.  After the children finished the second condition, they were 
asked to sit at a small table in the testing room, where they completed the Role Play 
Interview.  Once the interview was over, there was a short break while Experimenter 2 
set up the third condition of Cyberball, and Experimenter 1 completed the Parent Follow-
up about the children’s role play behavior.  Then Experimenter 1 took the participants 
back into the testing room and gave them instructions for the third condition.  After the 
children finished, they were asked to sit at a small table in the testing room, where they 
completed the Berkeley Puppet Interview (BPI).  A short break was given in the middle 
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of the BPI.  Because deception was used for the Cyberball task, participants were 
debriefed following completion of the BPI.  Including the cover stories and set-up time, it 
took approximately 40 minutes to complete the Cyberball task (each condition lasted 
approximately 5 minutes).  The Pretend Phone Conversation and Action Pantomime tasks 
took approximately 10 minutes combined; the Role Play Interview took approximately 15 
minutes; the Berkeley Puppet Interview took approximately 20 minutes.  The entire 
session was video-recorded. 
Results 
Cyberball.  As in Study 1, the Cyberball game was divided into the Baseline 
period (i.e., from the beginning of the game until the onset of a co-player/wall being 
excluded) and the Exclusion period (i.e., from the onset of a co-player/wall being 
excluded until the end of the game), as well as further sub-divided into the first and 
second halves of the Baseline and Exclusion periods.  The percentage of passes from the 
participant to the excluded player/wall were calculated for each half of the Baseline and 
Exclusion periods in the Real, Fiction, and Control conditions (the number of times the 
participant passed the ball to the excluded player/wall divided by the total number of 
passes to all three players/walls, multiplied by 100) (see Table 5 for means and standard 
deviations).  These percentages were used to create three change scores (one for each 
condition) that were used as an index of the percent increase of passes to the excluded 
player from Baseline to Exclusion (percentage of passes to the excluded player/wall 
during Exclusion minus the percentage of passes to the excluded player/wall during 
Baseline).  As in Study 1, positive change scores (increase in the percent of passes from 
Baseline to Exclusion) were interpreted as attempts to include the excluded player/wall.  
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Negative change scores (decrease in the percent of passes from Baseline to Exclusion) 
were interpreted as attempts to exclude the excluded player/wall, a pattern that might 
indicate that the participant was attempting to affiliate with the two included 
players/walls.  Change scores near zero were interpreted as no attempt to either exclude 
or include the excluded player/wall, a pattern that might indicate the participant did not 
notice that one of the players/walls was being excluded.  
 
Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Percentage of Passes to the 
Excluded Co-Player/Wall During the First and Second Half of the Baseline and 
Exclusion Periods for the Real, Fiction, and Control Conditions 
 
 First half 
 
Second half 
 
Baseline 
 
Real 30.88 (18.14) 26.90 (20.00)* 
Fiction 30.30 (18.59) 32.65 (22.43) 
Control 34.16 (18.17) 31.87 (20.35) 
 
Exclusion 
 
Real 
 
32.94 (18.53) 34.74 (20.86) 
Fiction 
 
33.07 (20.96) 37.16 (21.34) 
Control 37.14 (22.17) 
 
36.17 (21.98) 
*Significantly lower than chance, t (70) = -2.57, p = .012 
 
Order effects.  Because there were three conditions, there were six possible 
counterbalanced orders with 10 to 14 participants randomly assigned to each order (Real 
1st, Fiction 2nd, Control 3rd; Real 1st, Control 2nd, Fiction 3rd; Fiction 1st, Real 2nd, Control 
3rd; Fiction 1st, Control 2nd, Real 3rd; Control 1st, Real 2nd, Fiction 3rd; Control 1st, Fiction 
2nd, Real 3rd).  To assess the possibility that children’s responses were effected by the 
  72
order in which they completed the conditions, I conducted a 3 X 6 mixed factorial 
ANOVA with condition (Real vs. Fiction vs. Control) as a within-subjects factor, order 
(comparing the 6 possible orders) as a between-subjects factor, and Cyberball change 
scores for the Baseline and Exclusion periods as the dependent variable.  There were no 
main effects of order or condition and no interaction between order and condition (ps > 
.25).  Similar results are found when using the change scores based on the second half of 
the Baseline period (i.e., after children had become familiar with the game) and the 
second half of the Exclusion period (after children had had ample opportunity to notice 
that a player was being excluded) (ps > .50).  Although inspection of Figure 2 suggests 
that the change scores varied across orders, the differences between the means were small 
compared to the substantial variability in the change scores for each order.  I also 
examined the possibility of order effects in other ways (e.g., comparing the change scores 
for each condition when the Real Condition was first vs. when the Fiction Condition was 
first vs. when the Control Condition was first, collapsing across the conditions that 
occurred second and third; ps > .40), as well as including age and gender as between 
subjects factors (ps > .20).  None of these analyses yielded any significant effects of 
order.  Therefore, I have reported the results collapsing across order. 
Condition differences.  The substantial variability in the change scores within 
each condition suggests that children approached the task in a variety of different ways.  
The decision to pass to a particular co-player/wall could reflect: (a) a desire to include the 
excluded co-player/wall, (b) a preference to affiliate with the other two co-players/walls, 
(c) the maintenance of a pattern (e.g., passing the ball in a particular order), (d) a desire to 
throw the ball back to the co-player/wall that threw it to the participant, (e) an  
  
Figure 2.  Mean Change Scores (Second H
Condition by Condition Order (R = Real Condition, F = Fiction Condition, C = Control 
Condition) 
 
idiosyncratic preference for a particular co
out one’s own passes, or (g) some combination of these factors.  The variability in 
children’s behavior could also reflect individual differences in whether the children 
explicitly noticed that a co-player/wall was being excluded.  Even the adults in
did not always notice the exclusion.
The large standard deviations present a challenge for these analyses because 
comparisons of overall condition averages are rendered meaningless.  In order to proceed, 
I examined information from the Berkeley 
children’s individual reactions to Cyberball might help to explain the variability in the 
responses.  None of the variables in the BPI responses about the extent to which 
participants (1) had a favorite co
excluded, (3) felt empathetic for the excluded real or fictional co
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alf of Baseline and Exclusion) for Each 
-player/wall or location, (f) a tendency to
   
Puppet Interview (BPI) to determine if 
-player/wall, (2) noticed that a co-player/wall was being 
-players, or (4) believed 
 
 even 
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the deception used for the Real Condition were related to children’s Cyberball change 
scores (ps > .10).  For example, replicating the result of Study 1 with adults, the extent 
that children explicitly reported noticing that a co-player/wall was excluded did not 
predict their pattern of throws. 
In addition to asking children specifically about Cyberball, I collected information 
about children’s real life empathy, prosocial behavior, theory of mind, pretend play, and 
exposure to fiction, as well as gender and age.  I next investigated the extent that 
individual differences in these variables were related to Cyberball change scores.  None 
accounted for the variability in the behavioral responses during Cyberball (ps > .10; see 
Table 6 for correlations) – with one exception: individual differences in children’s 
tendency to empathize in real world situations. 
To test the differences between conditions with BPI real life empathy scores as a 
covariate, a Repeated Measures ANCOVA was conducted with condition (Control vs. 
Real vs. Fiction) as the within subjects factor, and Cyberball change scores for the second 
half of Baseline and the second half of Exclusion as the dependent variable (see Table 7 
for the Means, Standard Deviations, and Standard Errors).  There was not a significant 
main effect of real life empathy, F (1, 64) = .413, p = .523, partial η2 = .006, but there 
was a marginally significant main effect of condition, F (2, 128) = 2.71, p = .07, partial 
η
2
 = .041, and a significant interaction between condition and real life empathy, F (2, 
128) = 3.12, p = .048, partial η2 = .046.  Analyses of contrasts revealed a significant 
difference between change scores in the Real Condition compared to change scores in the 
Control and Fiction Conditions for both the main effect of condition, F (1, 64) = 5.213, p 
= .026, partial η2 = .075, and the interaction between condition and real life empathy,  
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Table 6 
Correlations Between Real, Fiction, and Control Condition Change Scores, Real Life 
Empathy, Prosocial Behavior, Anthropomorphism, Theory of Mind, Fiction Involvement, 
and Pretend Phone Conversation 
 
 Real 
Condition 
Change Scores 
 
Fiction 
Condition 
Change Scores 
 
Control 
Condition 
Change 
Scores 
 
Real Condition Change Scores 
 
   
Fiction Condition Change Scores 
 
-.047   
Control Condition Change Scores 
 
.003 -.049  
Real Life Empathy 
 
.283* -.132 -.028 
Real Life Prosocial Behavior 
 
.139 -.012 .037 
Anthropomorphism 
 
.145 -.001 .127 
Theory of Mind (Total Scores) 
 
.043 -.018 -.055 
Parent Book Composite 
 
.162 -.014 -.007 
Child Fiction Book Composite 
 
.188 .030 -.069 
Child Screen-based Fiction 
Composite 
 
.091 .075 -.052 
Pretend Phone Conversation 
Total Scores 
.161 .054 -.112 
Pretend Phone Conversation 
Number of Words 
.188 -.079 .110 
*p = .021 
 
F (1, 64) = 6.058, p = .017, partial η2 = .086.  After controlling for real life empathy, 
children’s change scores were higher in the Real Condition than they were in the Fiction 
and Control Conditions (see Figure 3).  Furthermore, change scores for the Real 
  
Condition were significantly above c
.004, were marginally above chance for the Fiction Condition, 
were not different from chance 
 
Table 7 
Means, Standard Deviations, Standard Errors, and Minimum and Maximum Scores for 
Real, Fiction, and Control Condition Change Scores for the Second Half of Baseline and 
Exclusion Controlling for BPI Real Life Empathy Scores
 
Condition Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation
Control 4.68 
Real 7.89 
Fiction 4.85 
Note: N = 66 because there were missing real life empathy scores for 5 children due to 
technical errors with the video and/or audio recording equipment.  There were no 
differences between the conditions for these 66 participants 
empathy, indicating that it is meaningful to control for empathy rather than the 
differences between conditions being a pattern specific to these particular participants.  
 
Figure 3.  Mean Change Scores for Each Condition for the Second Half of Baseline and 
Exclusion Controlling for BPI Real Life Empathy
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hance (i.e., significantly above 0), t (70) = 2.99, 
t (70) = 1.90, p
for the Control Condition, t (70) = 1.61, p = .113.
 
 
Standard Error Minimum 
Score 
22.27 2.76 -42.86 
22.81 2.71 -75.00 
21.49 2.64 -60.00 
without controlling for 
 
 
Real Fiction 
Condition
p = 
 = .061, but 
 
Maximum 
Score 
50.00 
66.67 
54.76 
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This pattern is contrary to my hypothesis that change scores in both the Real and 
Fiction Conditions would be higher than change scores in the Control Condition.  Only in 
the Real Condition were children significantly moved to take steps to include the 
excluded co-player.  Although these results are interesting, they should be interpreted 
with caution because they are only significant when controlling for children’s abilities to 
empathize in real life situations and there were no significant differences between the 
conditions for the change scores for the entire Baseline and Exclusion periods (even 
when controlling for real life empathy).  A second analysis using median split scores for 
real life empathy (i.e., children with real life empathy scores above the median of 4.86 
were categorized as having high empathy and children with real life empathy scores 
below the median of 4.86 were categorized as having low empathy) was not significant 
(ps > .15). 
Includers vs. excluders.  Another way to evaluate individual differences in 
Cyberball behavior is to categorize children as being includers (i.e., attempting to include 
the excluded co-player/wall in the Exclusion period) or excluders (i.e., making no attempt 
to include the excluded co-player/wall in the Exclusion period).  Children were 
categorized as being above (n = 8), below (n = 9), or at chance (n = 54) using a binomial 
test for the proportion of passes to the excluded real co-player during the second half of 
the Exclusion period in the Real Condition.  There were no significant differences 
between these groups of children on Fiction or Control Condition change scores (ps > .1).  
I also attempted to categorize children based on their pattern of throws during the 
Exclusion period (e.g., an increasing tendency to throw only to the excluded co-
player/wall), but there was no clear basis for categorization.  Therefore, using change 
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scores for each condition seems to be more meaningful then categorizing children based 
on their pattern of throws. 
Correlations between the conditions.  Contrary to the hypothesis that the Real 
and Fiction Conditions would be correlated, change scores in the Real Condition were 
uncorrelated with change scores in the Fiction Condition (for both the entire Baseline and 
Exclusion periods and the second halves of the Baseline and Exclusion periods; ps > .50).  
Change scores for the Real and Fiction Conditions were also uncorrelated with change 
scores for the Control Condition (for both the entire Baseline and Exclusion periods and 
the second halves of the Baseline and Exclusion periods; ps > .06; note that a Bonferroni 
correction requires a significance level of .017 for these analyses).  
Reactions to Cyberball.  There was not a difference between the empathy 
children felt for the excluded co-player in the Real Condition (M = 3.03, SD = 1.53) 
compared to the empathy children felt for the excluded co-player in the Fiction Condition 
(M = 3.06, SD = 1.56), t (62) = -.043, p = .965.  In fact, the empathy that children felt for 
the real and fictional co-players was significantly positively correlated, r (61) = .565, p < 
.001; children who reported feeling high amounts of empathy for a real co-player also 
reported feeling high amounts of empathy for a fictional co-player.  This suggests that 
children have a similar emotional reaction to an excluded real co-player as they do to an 
excluded fictional co-player, a finding that is surprising considering that children’s 
behavioral reactions differed when a real co-player was excluded compared to when a 
fictional co-player was excluded. 
Feeling empathy for the excluded real co-player was significantly positively 
correlated with BPI real life empathy scores, r (63) = .317, p = .01, but not BPI real life 
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prosocial behavior scores, r (63) = .06, p = .64.  Feeling empathy for the excluded 
fictional co-player was not correlated with BPI real life empathy or prosocial behavior 
scores (ps > .06; note that a Bonferroni correction requires a significance level of .0125 
for these analyses).  These results indicate that children’s self-reports of feeling empathy 
towards the excluded real co-player, but not the excluded fictional co-player, relate to 
their self-reports of empathy in real-world situations.  This could also help explain why 
participants attempted to include the excluded real co-player more than the fictional co-
player. 
There was a difference in noticing that a co-player/wall was excluded between the 
Real, Fiction, and Control Conditions, F (2, 112) = 3.832, p = .025, partial η2 = .064.  
Participants were more likely to notice that a co-player was excluded in the Real 
condition (M = 4.02, SD = 2.0) and that a wall was excluded in the Control Condition (M 
= 4.06, SD = 1.95) than they were to notice that a co-player was excluded in the Fiction 
Condition (M = 3.33, SD = 1.90), F (1, 56) = 5.97, p = .018.  However, this was unrelated 
to Cyberball change scores (ps > .09).   
Other results.  Although the primary goal of this dissertation research was to 
examine prosocial behavior in reaction to social exclusion in real and fictional social 
interactions, the results for the individual differences measures were interesting in their 
own right.  In what follows, I shift from discussing results related to Cyberball to report 
the relations between individual differences in real life empathy, prosocial behavior, 
theory of mind, pretend play, and fiction exposure.   
Real life empathy, prosocial behavior, and theory of mind.  See Table 8 for 
descriptive statistics for the subscales and composite scores of real life empathy (from the 
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Berkeley Puppet Interview), prosocial behavior (from the Berkeley Puppet Interview), 
and theory of mind (from the Children’s Social Understanding Scale).  Age and gender 
were significantly related to real life empathy scores.  8-year-olds (M = 5.00, SD = .59) 
had significantly higher empathy scores than 5-year-olds (M = 4.45, SD = .82), F (1, 62) 
= 12.57, p = .001, partial η2 = .169.  Girls (M = 5.00, SD = .68) had significantly higher 
empathy scores than boys (M = 4.46, SD = .74), F (1, 62) = 12.38, p = .001, partial η2 = 
.166.  There was also a marginally significant interaction between age and gender, F (1, 
62) = 3.93, p = .052, partial η2 = .06, indicating that the gender difference was more 
pronounced for 5-year-olds than it was for 8-year-olds, with 5-year-old boys having the 
lowest BPI empathy scores (M = 4.0, SD = .62) compared to 5-year-old girls (M = 4.87, 
SD = .76), 8-year-old boys (M = 4.87, SD = .58), and 8-year-old girls (M = 5.12, SD = 
.60).  These results are consistent with previous research showing that empathy increases 
with age (Saarni, Campos, Camras, & Witherington, 2006) and that girls have superior 
empathizing skills compared to boys (Wakabayashi, Sasaki, & Ogawa, 2012).   
 
Table 8 
Means, Standard Deviations (in Parentheses), and Minimum and Maximum Scores for 
Real Life Empathy, Prosocial Behavior, and Theory of Mind 
 
Subscale or Composite Score Mean (SD) Min – Max 
scores 
 
Empathy (N = 66) 
 
4.74 (.75) 3.07 – 6.0 
Prosocial Behavior (N = 66) 
 
5.39 (.73) 3.14 – 6.14 
Theory of Mind Total Scores (N = 71) 
 
3.41 (.33) 2.21 – 3.95 
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Three Pearson’s correlations showed that real life prosocial behavior scores were 
significantly positively correlated with real life empathy scores controlling for age, r (63) 
= .401, p = .001.  This is a result that is consistent with the literature that empathy and 
prosocial behavior are related (Eisenberg et al., 2007).   
Age and gender were unrelated to theory of mind (ps > .09).  Theory of mind 
scores were significantly correlated with empathy scores, r (64) = .317, p = .01, but not 
prosocial behavior, r (64) = .064, p = .612.  The significant positive correlation between 
theory of mind scores and empathy scores remains after the Bonferroni correction, which 
requires a significance level of .017, and after controlling for age, r (63) = .261, p = .036.  
This is a relationship that replicates previous research (Harris & Saarni, 1989). 
Pretend Play Assessment . 
Role play (child role play interview and parent role play questionnaire).  There 
were 17 children (23.9% of the sample) coded as having invisible friends and 14 children 
(19.7% of the sample) coded as having personified objects (see Table 9 for examples of 
invisible friends and personified objects).  Overall, there were 29 children (40.8% of the 
sample) coded as having one type of imaginary companion (see Table 10 for frequencies 
of invisible friends, personified objects, and any type of imaginary companion as a 
function of age and gender).  Two of these children were coded as having both an 
invisible friend and a personified object.  For these children, two coders coded the 
predominant type of imaginary companion based on the child- and parent-reports (100% 
reliability).  This resulted in 17 children coded as having invisible friends, 12 as having 
personified objects, and 42 as having no imaginary companion. 
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Table 9 
Examples of Invisible Friends and Personified Objects 
 
Type of imaginary 
companion 
Age and 
gender of child 
 
Name and description of imaginary 
companion 
 
Invisible friends 
 
  
 5-year-old boy 
 
Vambi, a 1,500-year-old vampire, who the 
child can ride, shows up by the child 
pressing a button in his house, and chews on 
the child’s toys. 
 
 5-year-old girl Squinch, a creature with a small body and a 
pointy horn on her head, who knows to show 
up for the child by using a little computer in 
her car. 
 
 8-year-old boy Baba, an invisible creature who is partly 
human and partly something else; Petee, a 
red bird who likes red and has a red sports 
car; and Ee-oo-ah, who is the biggest, 
strongest, and is “on the top” and likes the 
color black.  The child would talk to and 
“hang-out” with Baba, Petee, and Ee-oo-ah. 
 
 8-year-old girl Snoozer, a nice, funny hamster who hides 
and sleeps in the child’s backpack 
 
Personified objects 
 
  
 5-year-old boy 
 
Policey, a toy police badge, who has ‘special 
effects’ when he is in the child’s pocket; 
child said that Policey and he always do the 
same thing together and they do not argue. 
 
 5-year-old girl 
 
Tom, a purple stuffed monkey, who is the 
child’s prince; child said that Tom is “mostly 
my friend and doesn’t act rude to me.” 
 
 8-year-old boy Polka Dot, a stuffed Dalmatian, who is nice 
and likes to play. 
 
 8-year-old girl Luke, a stuffed penguin with a bow that 
lights up; child said that they “argue over 
when we want to sleep or play.” 
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Table 10 
Frequencies (and Percent of Entire Sample) for Each Type of Imaginary Companion as a 
Function of Age and Gender 
 
  Imaginary Companion Type 
 
Age Gender Invisible Friend Personified Object 
 
Total 
 
 
5-year-
olds 
 
Male 2 (2.8%) 3 (4.2%) 5 (7.0%) 
Female 2 (2.8%) 7 (9.9%) 9 (12.7%) 
 
8-year-
olds 
 
Male 6 (8.5%) 2 (2.8%) 7 (9.9%) 
Female 7 (9.9%) 2 (2.8%) 8 (11.3%) 
 
Age was significantly related to imaginary companion status; 8-year-olds were 
more likely to have an invisible friend, while 5-year-olds were more likely to have a 
personified object; 5- and 8-year-olds were equally as likely to not have an imaginary 
companion, χ2 (2, N = 71) = 10.09, p = .006, Cramer’s V = .377.  This finding supports 
previous research showing that older children are more likely to have invisible friends 
than personified objects (Taylor et al., 2004; note, however that there were no differences 
between the likelihood of having an invisible friend and personified object in younger 
children in Taylor et al.’s study).  This relationship between imaginary companion status 
and age suggests that the type of role play in which children engage is related to 
development rather than the ability to engage in role play, as 5- and 8-year-olds were 
equally as likely to not engage in role play.  Gender and imaginary companion status 
were not related, χ2 (2, N = 71) = 1.76, p = .415. 
Behavioral measure of role play (pretend phone conversation task).  The average 
total pretend phone conversation score was 3.47 (SD = 1.5; ranging from 1 to 5) and the 
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average number of words used during the pretend phone conversation was 8.39 (SD = 
14.0; ranging from 0 to 74).  8-year-olds (M = 12.6, SD = 17.64) used more words during 
the phone task than 5-year-olds (M = 4.06, SD = 6.74), t (44) = 2.67, p = .011 (equal 
variances not assumed).  After controlling for the number of words used during the 
pretend phone conversation, age was not significantly related to total phone task scores, F 
(1, 66) = .098, p = .756.  Gender was unrelated to both phone task scores (ps > .20). 
Object substitution (action pantomime task).  As would be expected from 
previous research showing that the use of symbolic objects in pretend actions increases 
with age (Dick et al., 2005; Overton & Jackson, 1973), 8-year-olds (M = 82.33%, SD = 
12.88%) used significantly more symbolic objects than 5-year-olds (M = 69.29%, SD = 
18.29%), t (60.9) = 3.47, p = .001 (equal variances not assumed).  Gender was not related 
to the use of symbolic objects, t (69) = 1.75, p = .085, which is consistent with previous 
research (Dick et al., 2005; Overton & Jackson, 1973). 
Relationships between pretend play assessment subscales. Previous research has 
found that children with imaginary companions were better able to generate a pretend 
conversation during the phone task than children without imaginary companions.  Thus, 
child- and parent-reports of children’s engagement in role play out of the lab predicts 
performance on a behavioral assessment of role play (Tahiroglu, Mannering, & Taylor, 
2011; Taylor, Sachet, Maring, and Mannering, 2013).  The results of Study 2 replicated 
this finding.  Children with imaginary companions (combining invisible friends and 
personified objects) (M = 4.03, SD = 1.24) had higher total pretend phone conversation 
scores than children without imaginary companions (M = 3.07, SD = 1.56), t (67) = 2.87, 
p = .005 (equal variances not assumed), providing further evidence that the role play 
  85
interview/questionnaire is a valid measure of children’s role play.  Imaginary companion 
status was unrelated to number of words used during the pretend phone conversation, t 
(67) = 1.67, p = .10.  Children with imaginary companions differ more from other 
children in the content of what they say (i.e., generating content that goes beyond a 
stereotyped greeting) than in the quantity of what they say (i.e., the number of words). 
My colleagues and I have previously argued that engagement in role play and 
object substitution ability show different patterns of relationships, such that engagement 
in role play is more of an individual difference variable that reflects children’s interests, 
personalities, and proclivities, while object substitution ability is more related to 
development (Sachet & Mottweiler, in press; Taylor et al., 2013).  In Study 2, imaginary 
companion status and total phone task scores were unrelated to action pantomime scores 
(ps > .50), replicating previous studies showing no relationship between children’s role 
play behavior and object substitution skills (Taylor et al., 2013).  Taken together with the 
finding of a relationship between age and action pantomime scores, these results support 
the idea that role play and object substitution show different patterns of correlations, with 
role play being more of an individual differences and object substitution being more 
related to development (Sachet & Mottweiler, in press). 
Fiction Involvement Questionnaire.  See Table 11 for descriptive statistics for 
children’s fiction and parents’ fiction and nonfiction exposure.  There were significant 
differences in the amount of children’s exposure to fiction in books and screen-based 
media.  Children were more likely to be exposed to fiction in film and television (M = 
21.38, SD = 6.36) than to fiction in books (M = 12.32, SD = 5.85), t (70) = 10.23, p < 
.001, a finding that supports previous research about the prevalence of screen-based 
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media in children’s lives (Rideout & Hammel, 2006).  Parents were more familiar with 
fiction authors (M = 3.59, SD = 5.03) than nonfiction authors (M = 8.46, SD = 8.63), t 
(70) = 6.71, p < .001, but these two subscores were highly correlated, r (69) = .719, p < 
.001, indicating that parents who read numerous fiction books also read a relatively large 
amount of nonfiction books.  This high correlation between parents’ familiarity with 
fiction and nonfiction justifies the composite score of parents’ overall book exposure, 
which will be used in future analyses instead of parent fiction and nonfiction book scores 
separately. 
 
Table 11 
Means, Standard Deviations (in Parentheses), and Minimum and Maximum Scores for 
the Fiction Involvement Questionnaire 
 
Subscale or Composite Score Mean (SD) Min – Max 
scores 
Child Fiction Book Composite (N = 71) 
 
12.32 (5.85) .5 – 35.5 
Child Screen-based Fiction Composite 
(N = 71) 
 
21.38 (6.36) 4.5 – 34.5 
Parent Author Fiction (N = 71) 
 
8.46 (8.63) -2.0 – 40.0 
Parent Author Nonfiction (N = 71) 
 
3.59 (5.03) -1.0 – 32.0 
Parent Book Composite (N = 71) 
 
6.03 (6.37) -1.5 – 36.0 
 
Parents’ exposure to books was highly correlated with children’s fiction book 
exposure, r (69) = .728, p < .001, but not to children’s exposure to screen-based fiction, r 
(69) = .067, p = .581.  These results suggest that parents’ reading habits and preferences 
are related to children’s book exposure, but not to children’s screen-based media 
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exposure.  Age and gender were unrelated to children’s exposure to fiction books, 
children’s exposure to screen-based fiction, and parents’ exposure to books (ps > .10). 
Relationships between individual differences measures.  To further investigate 
the idea that engagement in role play is more of an individual difference variable that 
reflects children’s interests, personalities, and proclivities, while object substitution 
ability is more related to development (Sachet & Mottweiler, in press; Taylor et al., 
2013), imaginary companion status and action pantomime scores (separately) were 
investigated in relation to theory of mind, composite empathy/prosocial scores, children’s 
exposure to fiction in books, children’s exposure to screen-based fiction, and parents’ 
exposure to books, which are variables that are more related to age.  Five comparisons 
were conducted, requiring a significance level of .01 with a Bonferroni correction to 
control for multiple comparisons.  Children with imaginary companions (M = 14.28, SD 
= 6.85) had marginally significantly more exposure to fiction in books than children 
without imaginary companions (M = 10.96, SD = 4.67), t (69) = 2.42, p = .018.  The 
parents of children with imaginary companions (M = 8.02, SD = 7.88) also had 
marginally significantly more exposure to books than children without imaginary 
companions (M = 4.65, SD = 4.70), t (69) = 2.25, p = .028.  These trends remained after 
controlling for age (ps < .03).  There was not a significant difference between children 
with and without imaginary companions on their exposure to screen-based fiction, t (69) 
= .756, p = .452.  Imaginary companion status was also unrelated to children’s theory of 
mind and everyday empathy/prosocial behavior (ps > .10).  Action pantomime scores 
were unrelated to all individual difference measures, including social understanding and 
everyday empathy/prosocial behavior (ps > .06).  Note, however, that the internal 
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consistency of the items for the total action pantomime score was relatively low; 
therefore, it is difficult to interpret this finding. 
Previous research has shown that exposure to children’s fiction in books and film 
is related to children’s theory of mind (Mar et al., 2010).  To examine this the relations 
between children’s exposure to fiction in books and screen-based media, parents’ 
exposure to books, theory of mind, and everyday empathy/prosocial behavior scores were 
investigated.  Because 4 comparisons were conducted, a Bonferroni correction required a 
significance level of .013.  Children’s fiction book scores were significantly positively 
correlated with total social understanding scores controlling for age, r (68) = .345, p = 
.003, but not to composite empathy/prosocial scores, r (64) = -.036, p = .774.  Children’s 
exposure to screen-based fiction and parents’ exposure to books were not correlated with 
theory of mind or the composite empathy/prosocial score (ps > .09).  These results 
partially support Mar et al.’s (2010) finding, in that children’s fiction book exposure, but 
not screen-based fiction exposure was related to children’s social understanding. 
Discussion 
Cyberball.  In this study, 5- and 8-year-old children tended to behave more 
prosocially when playing with real children than when playing with fictional characters, 
controlling for individual differences in children’s empathy.  Specifically, children 
increased the number of times they threw the ball to a real co-player who was being 
excluded by other co-players in a computerized ball-tossing game.  When the co-players 
were fictional characters, children did not treat an excluded co-player differently than an 
excluded wall (in a non-social Control Condition).  For both Fiction and Control 
Conditions, they were significantly less likely to address the exclusion with their own 
  89
throws of the ball than for the Real Condition.  Although children took steps to remedy 
the unfair exclusion when the other players were believed to be real children, they felt 
equally empathetic towards the excluded real and fictional co-players.  Thus, there was a 
dissociation between what children experienced emotionally and how they reacted 
behaviorally in response to real and fictional social interactions.  While these results are 
interesting, they must be interpreted with caution because the pattern was statistically 
significant only when the second half of Baseline and Exclusion were used and were not 
significant unless individual differences in real life empathy were controlled.  
While not underestimating the need for additional empirical support for this 
pattern of results, it is interesting to speculate about why children might help real 
individuals but not fictional ones.  After all, my original expectation was quite different; 
the main hypothesis guiding this research was that the Cyberball task would elicit 
prosocial behavior from children in both the Real and Fiction Conditions.  The pattern 
found in Study 2 is inconsistent with this hypothesis, indicating a need to rethink the 
correspondence between real and fictional experiences.  I speculate about this issue in the 
General Discussion. 
There were several limitations of this study, including the large amount of 
variability in the Cyberball behavior scores, a session that was too long for many of the 
participants, and many participants failing to notice the exclusion.  Nevertheless, the 
results suggest that future research should explore the interesting disconnect between 
emotional and behavior responses to fictional situations and characters.  
Other results.  Children were much more likely to be exposed to fiction in film 
and television than fiction in books.  Interestingly, children’s exposure to fiction in 
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books, but not to fiction in film or television, was related to children’s theory of mind, 
which partially supports the previous finding that exposure to children’s fiction in books 
and films, but not television was related to children’s social understanding (Mar et al., 
2010).  Note that this result does not suggest that exposure to fiction in books causes 
increases in theory of mind because of the possibility of third variables, such as parenting 
practices (e.g., parents who read more to their children might also have styles that 
promote theory of mind development).  It is also possible that children with superior 
social understanding skills enjoy reading fiction because they enjoy reading about the 
mental states of the characters in the books.  However, it is possible that exposure to 
fiction through books contributes to children’s social understanding abilities.  Future 
research should investigate this possibility experimentally, by manipulating fiction book 
exposure in a group of young children and measuring the effects on social understanding. 
Another interesting result was a trend that children with imaginary companions 
had more exposure to fiction books, as did their parents, than children without imaginary 
companions.  This trend is worth noting because no previous research has explored the 
possibility of a relation between children’s fiction involvement and their engagement in 
role play.  This finding is consistent with the evidence that children with imaginary 
companions have higher fantasy predisposition, meaning that they are more likely to 
incorporate myth, magic, and other fantasy elements into their play, to daydream, and to 
be captured by vivid memories and imaginings (Bouldin, 2006; Bouldin & Pratt, 1999; 
Kidd, Rogers, & Rogers, 2010).  Furthermore, reading has been suggested to impact 
children’s imaginations (Singer & Singer, 2005).  There is evidence that adults who had 
imaginary companions as children tend to become more absorbed in imaginative 
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activities than adults who did not have imaginary companions as children (Kidd, Rogers, 
& Rogers, 2010).  Children with imaginary companions could also have this tendency to 
become absorbed in fictional experiences, which could explain why they might be more 
likely to be interested in reading fiction.  Although this is an interesting result, it must be 
interpreted with caution and will need to be replicated in future research, as it was only 
marginally significant after the Bonferroni correction to control for multiple comparisons. 
It is interesting that not only children’s exposure to fiction, but also their parents’ 
exposure to books (both fiction and nonfiction) was marginally related to having an 
imaginary companion.  Perhaps parents who read more have certain parenting styles that 
encourage their children’s role play as well as reading fiction.  However, this could be an 
artifact of the measure of fiction involvement (because the parent completed both the 
measure of their own book exposure as well as their child’s book exposure).  It is also 
interesting that this result did not extend to children’s exposure to fiction in film and 
television.  Singer and Singer (2005) have suggested that there are special cognitive 
benefits of reading, such as active encoding and processing, that make reading more 
important to imagination then screen-based media.  The finding that children with 
imaginary companions are more exposed to fiction in books, but not fiction in television 
or film, than children without imaginary companions further supports this idea.   
In summary, Study 2 presents new, although tentative, information about 
children’s reactions to real and fictional social interactions, provides a replication of 
previous research investigating different forms of pretend play, and furthers our 
understanding of children’s engagement in role play with a novel finding about the 
fiction exposure of children with imaginary companions.  Perhaps the most important 
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contribution of this research is the redirecting of future work away from a theoretical 
framework in which fiction is expected to simulate the emotional and behavioral 
responses of real life situations.  Instead the results of this study suggest that it will be 
more useful to investigate the differences in behavioral responses to fiction and real life 
and explore why these distinctions might be beneficial.  
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CHAPTER IV 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The goals of this dissertation were to (1) develop a new behavioral measure of 
prosocial behavior by adapting the Cyberball paradigm and designing a nonsocial Control 
Condition to be used in comparison to social conditions, and (2) investigate the 
relationship between children’s reactions to real and fictional social interactions.  I first 
discuss the limitations of Cyberball as well as its potential for use in future research.  
With the limitations of the version of Cyberball used in this research in mind, I then turn 
to a discussion of how the results of Study 2 shed light on the extent of the 
correspondence between emotional and behavioral reactions to real life and fictional 
experiences.   
Cyberball as a Measure of Prosocial Behavior 
There were several limitations of using Cyberball as a behavioral measure of 
prosocial behavior, including (1) the large amount of variability in the Cyberball behavior 
scores, (2) many participants failing to notice the exclusion of one of the co-players, (3) 
participants’ real life prosocial behavior not being related to behavior during Cyberball, 
and (4) a session that was too long for many of the child participants.  Each of these will 
be discussed in turn.   
Large variability.  The large variability in each of the Cyberball conditions for 
both adults and children was a major limitation of this research.  Some of this variability 
was expected, which is why I collected information about real life prosocial behavior, 
empathy, theory of mind, anthropomorphism, attention to detail for the adults, and 
engagement in role play and exposure to fiction for the children.  These individual 
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differences measures were included to provide possible explanations for variability in 
responses during Cyberball.  However, the only individual differences that accounted for 
some of the variability in the data were the tendency to pay attention to detail for the 
adults and real life empathy for the children.   
Adults who reported that they had more of a tendency to pay attention to detail 
were more likely to attempt to include the excluded wall in the Control Condition.  It is 
possible that this occurred because paying attention to the details of the game, such as the 
asymmetry in passes to the three locations, is related to the tendency to systematize, 
which includes the desire to maintain and organize patterns (Billington, Baron-Cohen, & 
Bor, 2008).  However, although data for the Control Condition suggests that some 
participants might have attempted to increase the number of passes to the excluded wall 
in order to maintain a pattern, the attempts to include the excluded real co-player were 
not related to the tendency to pay attention to detail.  It is not obvious why systematizing 
tendencies would affect performance in the Control Condition but not the Real Condition.  
The lack of a correlation between the tendency to pay attention to detail and behavior in 
the Real Condition suggests that participants were not merely evening out the passes in 
that condition, but rather that they were trying to help the other person. 
For children, the measures of empathy did shed light on the Cyberball behavior 
scores.  I collected information about two types of empathy: (1) children’s general 
tendency to respond empathically in real life situations, and (2) more specifically, 
children’s empathic reactions to the real and fictional co-players in the Cyberball game.  
Controlling for individual differences in real life empathy revealed significant differences 
between children’s behavioral reactions towards the excluded real co-player compared to 
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the fictional co-player and the wall.  The Cyberball measure of empathy revealed that 
children had similar empathic emotional reactions to the real and fictional co-player.  
Because both measures of empathy helped to interpret the results of this study, it will be 
important to include a more comprehensive assessment of children’s empathy in future 
research. 
Another individual difference that could potentially account for variability in 
Cyberball scores is the type of strategy that participants use to decide where to throw the 
ball.  Strategies might have included (1) throwing the ball back to the co-player/wall that 
threw the ball to them (which would presumably result in negative prosocial behavior 
scores because the excluded co-player/wall would not have the opportunity to throw the 
ball to the participant), (2) maintaining a pattern (e.g., tossing to the left, middle, then 
right co-player/wall), (3) keeping track of which co-player/wall has not had the ball in a 
while (which would be the most likely to result in positive prosocial behavior scores 
because the participant would probably notice that a co-player/wall was left out of the 
game and thus, toss the ball more to the excluded co-player/wall), (4) passing to a 
favorite player/location, or (5) randomly tossing the ball (i.e., no strategy).  Although I 
collected some information about these kinds of strategies and behaviors, it would be 
useful to measure them more systematically in future research by adding items about 
possible strategies to the Reactions to Cyberball Questionnaire for adults and the 
Berkeley Puppet Interview for children.  However, note that some of these strategies 
might be implicit and not reported in an interview. 
Failure to notice exclusion.  Another limitation of the Cyberball task for both 
adults and children is that many participants did not explicitly notice that a co-player or 
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wall was excluded.  This could account for why prosocial behavior and theory of mind 
were not related to behavior during Cyberball and for why children did not attempt to 
include the excluded fictional co-player.  Children reported noticing that the real co-
player and the wall were excluded more often than they reported noticing that the 
fictional co-player was excluded.  It could be that children paid more attention to who 
was getting the ball in the Real Condition than in the Fiction Condition.  This finding is 
consistent with previous research suggesting that when people read expository nonfiction, 
they focus on integrating information from the text with their knowledge about a 
situation; whereas when people read literary fiction, they focus on details about the 
wording and meaning of the text (Zwaan, 1994).  Perhaps instead of paying attention to 
how often each fictional co-player was getting the ball, children focused on surface 
details of the game (e.g., the appearance of the fictional co-players). 
To clarify this possibility in future research, it might be helpful to collect 
information about participants’ level of attention during the game.  Participants could be 
tested about details of the game (e.g., the color shirt co-players were wearing; how often 
each player got the ball), or eye tracking could be used (i.e., if participants focus more on 
certain details, such as facial features, rather than where the ball is going throughout the 
game).  Eye tracking could also be useful as a participant-centered index of when (if 
ever) participants started to notice that a co-player/wall was excluded.  This index might 
be helpful for defining the onset of exclusion.  The onset of exclusion in both Study 1 and 
Study 2 was set to be at a certain point in the game and was defined by the last time that 
one of the two “excluder” co-players/walls passed the ball to the excluded co-player/wall.  
Defining exclusion in this way might have been problematic because not all participants 
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noticed the exclusion right away (if at all).  Therefore, using eye tracking to measure 
when participants noticed that a player was excluded might be a valuable tool for future 
research. 
It is less clear why children would notice that a wall was excluded more than 
noticing that a fictional co-player was excluded.  It is possible that noticing that a wall 
was excluded is related to systematizing in children, as it was in Study 1 with adults.  
Unfortunately, systematizing was not measured in Study 2, but would be beneficial to 
measure in future research.  
Although the Cyberball task was modified in Study 2 to make it more obvious 
that a co-player/wall was excluded (i.e., by lengthening the exclusion period), many 
children did not notice.  In future studies, it should be made much more obvious that a 
co-player/wall was excluded in each condition.  One way to do this would be to lengthen 
the exclusion period.  However, this strategy has the disadvantage that it would require 
shortening the Baseline period, thus making it difficult to collect a representative measure 
of the proportion of throws to the excluded co-player before the Exclusion period.  
Another way to make the exclusion more obvious would be to program Cyberball so that 
the excluded co-player/wall changes color, jumps up and down, or makes frustrated 
noises after not receiving the ball.  Additionally, participants could be primed to pay 
attention to exclusion by explicitly telling them to make sure that everyone gets the ball 
the same amount, or by playing a round of Cyberball during which they, themselves, are 
excluded, followed by a discussion of how it felt to be excluded and how other people 
might feel if they are excluded. 
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No relationship between prosocial behavior during Cyberball and real life 
prosocial behavior.  Another limitation of Cyberball is that with both adults and 
children, there was no evidence of a relationship between attempting to include the 
excluded real co-player (and for children, the excluded fictional co-player) and real life 
prosocial behavior.  This result could be because the Cyberball task taps implicit as well 
as explicit prosocial behavior, whereas all the general measures related to prosocial 
behavior (the Prosocialness Scale for Adults, the Autism Quotient Questionnaire, the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index, the Berkeley Puppet Interview, and the Children’s Social 
Understanding Scale) are self-report measures that require explicit awareness.  
The lack of a relationship between prosocial behavior during Cyberball and self-
reports of real life prosocial behavior suggests that my version of Cyberball might not be 
a valid measure of prosocial behavior.  In future studies, it would be worth assessing the 
relationship between prosocial behavior during Cyberball and other behavioral measures 
of prosocial behavior, such as (1) asking participants to write an email to each of the 
players in Cyberball and later coding them for prosocial content (Masten et al., 2010, 
2011) or (2) setting up a scenario in which participants could help an experimenter or 
confederate, which has been used with both children (e.g., Chambers & Ascione, 1987) 
and adults (e.g., Greitemeyer & Osswald, 2010) as a behavioral measure of real life 
prosocial tendencies.  It might also be useful to collect reports of real life prosocial 
behavior from other sources, such as teachers (e.g., Vitaro, Gagnon, & Tremblay, 1991), 
friends, or relatives, in addition to self-reports and parent-reports.    
Session length.  A limitation of Study 2 is that the 2-hour session was too long 
for some of the participants, especially the 5-year-olds.  Although there were several 
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breaks and the tasks were designed to be enjoyable for the children, by the time children 
played the third run of Cyberball, they might have been tired and bored.  In future 
research, it might be beneficial to use a between subjects design (which would, however, 
limit the ability to investigate correlations of behavior between conditions) or to test 
children in two or three separate, shorter sessions spread over several weeks (which 
would have the disadvantage of possible attrition).  
Potential of the Control Condition.  One of the contributions of this research 
was the successful development of a Control Condition as a useful tool for determining 
that participants’ reactions in the Real Condition were not merely to even out the passes 
to the excluded co-player.  In Study 1, there was a difference between participants’ 
reactions to the Real Condition compared to the Control Condition.  Specifically, 
participants attempted to include the excluded co-player more than they attempted to pass 
the ball to the excluded wall.  Note however, that this pattern was only seen when 
comparing the participants who completed the Real Condition first compared to those 
who completed the Control Condition first.  In Study 2, there were no order effects, and 
children treated the excluded wall differently than the excluded real co-player.  
Specifically, when controlling for individual differences in real life empathy, children 
increased their throws to the excluded real co-player more than they did to the excluded 
wall and the excluded fictional co-player.  This result was found when using the data 
from the second half of the Baseline period (after participants had time to get used to the 
game) and the second half of the Exclusion period (after participants had time to notice 
that a co-player/wall was being excluded).   
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Correspondence Between Real and Fictional Experiences  
Study 2 addressed the relationship between children’s reactions to real and 
fictional social interactions, which was the main focus of this dissertation.  Based on Mar 
and Oatley’s (2008) theory that fiction simulates real world situations and the research 
showing that fictional contexts can foster prosocial behavior (Gentile et al., 2009; 
Greitemeyer & Osswald, 2010, 2011; Mares & Woodard, 2005; Ostrov et al., 2006), I 
hypothesized that children would have similar reactions to the excluded fictional co-
player as they would to the excluded real co-player, and that reactions to these conditions 
would differ from reactions to the excluded wall.  The results from Study 2 did not 
support this hypothesis.  Instead, I found that children attempted to include the excluded 
real co-player more than the excluded wall or the excluded fictional co-player.  Thus, the 
Fiction Condition was more similar to the Control Condition than the Real Condition. 
Although children only showed prosocial behavior in response to the excluded 
real co-player, there were no differences between children’s reports of their empathic 
reactions towards the excluded real and fictional co-players.  Thus, there was a 
dissociation between how children behaved and what they felt.  These results must be 
interpreted with caution, however, because children’s empathic reactions were based on 
only two self-report questions for each condition in the Berkeley Puppet Interview and 
the differences between conditions were only seen when controlling for individual 
differences in children’s real life empathy and when using the second half of the Baseline 
period and the second half of the Exclusion period of Cyberball.   
Nonetheless, the results of Study 2 are interesting in light of other research 
suggesting that behavioral responses might be more connected to real life situations than 
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to fictional ones.  For example, according to Goldstein (2009), the reason why people 
find enjoyment in watching sad movies depicting events that would never be enjoyed if 
they occurred in real life is because it is only in real life situations that people are 
expected to deal with what has occurred.  This hypothesis is based on the results of a 
study in which Goldstein investigated whether emotional reactions of sadness and anxiety 
to fiction were different from emotional reactions to nonfiction and one’s own 
experiences.  She found that adults were equally likely to feel sadness when viewing 
fictional and nonfictional film clips and when recalling a sad personal event, but felt 
significantly more anxiety when recalling the personal event than when viewing the film 
clips.  Her interpretation of these results was that people might enjoy fiction partly 
because the sadness elicited by watching films is unadulterated by the anxiety that one 
experiences in addition to sadness in response to a personal challenge.  The anxiety felt in 
response to recollections of personal events might be because, in real life, we know that 
the experience will not vanish, but instead we must continue to cope with the situation.  
The anxiety might also motivate people to react appropriately to the scenario. 
In Study 2, participants experienced an event (i.e., the Cyberball game) with both 
real and fictional characters.  They expressed similar levels of empathic reaction when 
playing with real co-players as when playing with fictional co-players, but they were 
more likely to actually help the excluded real co-player.  This result suggests that 
Goldstein’s theory might extend to fictional situations such as what would be experienced 
in videogames (which are similar in many respects to Cyberball), in addition to passively 
viewing fiction, such as watching a movie.  Goldstein’s theory also suggests that if the 
stakes were raised in the Cyberball game (e.g., the excluded co-player exhibiting distress 
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in response to social exclusion), the difference between the Real and Fiction Conditions 
might be enhanced because increasing the participants’ anxiety about the need to help 
would only affect the Real Condition.   
Another area of research that suggests differences in behavioral responses to real 
and fictional content is recent work investigating the extent that children transfer 
information taught to them in different contexts.  Fiction is often used to teach children 
about real-world information with the assumption that fiction and fantasy are engaging 
and make the material more interesting (Lepper, Aspinwall, Mumme, & Chabay, 1990; 
Parker & Lepper, 1992).  However, there is growing evidence that children do not 
transfer information to the real world as well when they learn the information from 
fantastical characters as they do if they learn the information from realistic characters 
(Richert, Shawber, Hoffman, & Taylor, 2009; Richert & Smith, 2011) and that fictional 
contexts are sometimes not effective for teaching (Ganea, Pickard, & DeLoache, 2008; 
Mares & Acosta, 2008; DeLoache et al., 2010; Kuhl, Tsao, & Liu, 2003; Robb, Richert, 
& Wartella, 2009).  For example, Richert et al. (2009) found that preschool children were 
more likely to transfer the solution to a problem to a new situation in real life if it was 
taught to them by a real life character than by a fantasy character.  
Taken together, research on differences between emotional responses to movies, 
the transfer of information presented in real and fictional contexts, and the results of 
Study 2 suggest that real and fictional situations often differ in the behavioral responses 
that they elicit.  However, this should not be taken to imply that children cannot learn 
from fiction.  Children use their general knowledge when they pretend (e.g., a child who 
pretends to be a dog uses general knowledge about dogs), making shared pretend play a 
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vehicle for learning about the real world from others (Sutherland & Friedman, 2012).  In 
addition, fiction can be a way to explore emotional situations that one would not 
otherwise encounter.  
The results of Study 2 are consistent with the research suggesting that children 
and adults have similar emotional reactions to fictional experiences as they do to real life 
situations (Bourchier & Davis, 2000a; DiLalla & Watson, 1988; Golomb & Galasso, 
1995; Harris, 2000; Harris et al., 1991; Kavanaugh & Harris, 1999; Mar, Oatley, Djikic, 
Mullin, 2010; Oatley, 1999; Taylor et al., 2007; Taylor, 1999; Woolley, 1997).  However, 
the results of Study 2 are inconsistent with the studies showing that children and adults 
show similar behavioral reactions towards imagined situations as they do towards real life 
events (e.g., Johnson, 2000; Sachet, Frey, Jacobson, & Taylor, under review) and the 
facilitative effects of prosocial behavior and other positive abilities, attitudes, and 
behaviors learned in fictional contexts (e.g., videogames) on real life behaviors (e.g., 
Brambilla et al., 2012; Gentile et al., 2009; Greitemeyer & Osswald, 2010; Mares & 
Woodard, 2005; Ostrov et al., 2006; Turner & West, 2012). 
Why might there be a close connection between emotional reactions, but not for 
behavioral reactions to real and fictional situations?  One possibility lies in children’s 
abilities to tell the difference between what is real and what is pretend.  As reviewed in 
Chapter 1, children are quite skilled at distinguishing between fantasy and reality by the 
time they are 4 years old (Bourchier & Davis, 2000b; Bretherton & Beeghley, 1982; 
Estes, Wellman, & Woolley, 1989; Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1987; Harris, Brown, 
Marriott, Whittall, & Harmer, 1991; Sharon & Woolley, 2004; Wellman & Estes, 1986; 
Woolley & Wellman, 1993).  Therefore, the 5- and 8-year-old children in Study 2 were 
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old enough to have a firm grasp on the fantasy/reality distinction.  It could be that 
children had different behavioral reactions to the real and fictional co-player being 
excluded because they recognized that the fictional situation was not real, so there were 
no real consequences of a fictional character being excluded from the game, which is 
consistent with Goldstein’s (2009) view.   
Furthermore, Harris (2000) proposed a theory that might help explain the 
dissociation between the emotional and behavioral reactions in response to the real and 
fictional characters.  He suggested that we can simultaneously have an understanding that 
a fictional experience is not real while also having emotional reactions to fictional 
content because the emotional reaction is experienced automatically, independent of 
whether the stimulus is real or pretend.  According to his theory there are regulatory 
processes that can feed into the system that allow for decisions to be made about how to 
react to automatic emotional responses.  The children in Study 2 might have had an 
automatic emotional response in reaction to the game, regardless of whether the players 
were real or pretend, but their behavioral response was dependent on their evaluation of 
whether the co-players were real or fictional.  What is interesting is that this processing 
seems to have occurred outside of the children’s awareness because many of the children 
did not notice that a real or fictional co-player was being excluded.  An investigation of 
children’s responses to fiction and their abilities to distinguish fantasy from reality would 
be an interesting area for future research.  
Future Directions 
Despite the limitations of these studies, the differences between the Real and 
Control Conditions for the adults, and between the Real, Fiction, and Control Conditions 
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for children, suggest that participants had different behavioral reactions when a real 
person was excluded compared to when a fictional character or a wall were excluded.  
Furthermore, there was a dissociation between how children behaved and how they felt in 
response to the real and fictional social interaction.  These results present some 
interesting directions for future research.  
Reactions to real and fictional social interactions when another person or 
character is excluded.  The results that children showed different behavioral responses, 
but similar empathic responses towards the fictional and real co-players will need to be 
replicated in future research.  In this research, children’s general empathy as well as their 
specific empathic responses to the real and fictional co-players were valuable sources of 
information, but in future research, it will be important to include a more comprehensive 
measure of children’s emotional reactions to the excluded players.  This could be done by 
including more questions about different types of emotions (e.g., sadness, anxiety) in the 
Berkeley Puppet Interview or by collecting information about emotional reactions while 
participants are playing the game.  For example, while playing the game (1) children’s 
facial expressions could be recorded and later coded for emotional reactivity (e.g., 
frowning), (2) physiological responses could be measured, such as heart rate, which has 
been found to be associated with empathic responses in adults (Oliveira-Silva & 
Gonçalves, 2011), or (3) children could use an emotion thermometer to report the 
emotions they experience.  Including multiple measures of the emotions felt during 
Cyberball could help tease apart the mismatch between emotional and behavioral 
reactions that was found in Study 2. 
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Another avenue for future research would be to include the Fiction Condition, in 
addition to the Real and Control Conditions, for adults.  As suggested by Goldstein’s 
(2009) findings that adults have similar emotions of sadness, but different anxiety levels 
in response to real and fictional experiences, perhaps adults would show the same 
disconnect between emotions felt for and behavioral reactions towards the real and 
fictional co-players.  It is possible that adult participants would show a stronger 
dissociation than children between emotions and behavior because adults are more able to 
report and reflect on their emotions (Saarni et al., 2006). 
I have already argued that children did not attempt to include the fictional 
character because they did not feel the need to intervene in a fictional context, but it is 
also possible that children did not attempt to include the excluded fictional co-player 
because they were not given any background information about the fictional characters.  
Although the background information provided about the real children was minimal 
(children were told that the other children were the same age as the participant and that 
they were at other universities across the country), it might have been enough information 
for participants to identify with the children.  In contrast, no information was presented 
about the fictional characters beyond their names.  In future research, children should be 
given more (and equal amounts of) background information about the real and fictional 
co-players.  For example, parents could be asked to indicate three favorite cartoon 
characters and three of the children’s real friends (as well as to provide photographs of 
the children’s friends) prior to the session.  Alternatively, the same novel cartoon 
characters and real children that were used in Study 2 could be used, but information 
about each character and child could be provided before children play Cyberball with 
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them.  It would be interesting to see if children show similar patterns as were found in the 
present study with these modifications or if providing more (and equal) background 
information about real and fictional co-players would increase the similarities of 
prosocial responses to the excluded fictional co-player and the real co-player. 
Expanding the information provided about the co-players could also be used to 
test different hypotheses related to prosocial behavior, such as the theories of kin 
selection and reciprocal altruism.  Kin selection and reciprocal altruism are two theories 
to explain why people engage in prosocial behavior (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & 
Schroeder, 2005).  Kin selection relates to the evolutionary drive to help relatives 
(especially people who share your genes) more than strangers, while reciprocal altruism 
relates to helping people who are more likely to help you in the future.  Cyberball could 
be used to test both of these hypotheses.  To test the idea of kin selection, participants 
could play two conditions of Cyberball, both with a relative (e.g., a sibling) and two 
strangers.  In one condition, their relative would be excluded, while in the other 
condition, a stranger would be excluded; the attempts to include the excluded relative and 
stranger would be measured.  A similar design could be used to test the hypothesis of 
reciprocal altruism.  Participants would play Cyberball with someone who would be 
deemed as a potential valuable source of help in the future (e.g., a tutor for students who 
need help in a specific topic, such as math) and two strangers who would not be useful to 
the participant (e.g., students from another school).  Although the use of Cyberball as a 
behavioral measure of prosocial behavior in its present form is not ideal, my hope is to 
adjust it so that it is helpful for future research to test hypotheses such as these.   
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 Reactions to participants’ own exclusion.  Previous studies using Cyberball 
have attempted to use a non-social Control Condition by telling participants that the game 
was controlled by a computer program instead of leading them to believe that they were 
playing with other people (e.g., Tang & Richardson, 2012; Zadro et al., 2004).  
Participants who knew that the computer was controlling the game had similar levels of 
distress as they did when they believed that they were being excluded by real people.  
However, this “control” condition was flawed because it was social in nature due to the 
co-players being depicted as animated people.  It would be informative to include the 
Control Condition developed for this dissertation, to see if participants have the same 
negative responses to exclusion by inanimate objects that they do to exclusion by real and 
fictional co-players.  Based on previous research, I would expect that participants would 
be equally distressed when excluded by real and fictional co-players.  However, it is 
possible that participants would not be as distressed when excluded in the Control 
Condition, but instead they might report feelings of boredom or show disinterest in the 
game. 
Extending the previous suggestion to children would also be an interesting avenue 
for future research.  The effects of peer rejection on children’s development have been 
well documented.  For example, children who are victims of social exclusion have higher 
rates of negative psychological effects, such as social anxiety, depressive symptoms, low 
self-esteem, externalizing behavior problems (Laird, Jordan, Dodge, Pettit & Bates, 2001; 
Twenge, Catanese & Baumeister, 2003), reduced prosocial behavior (Moor et al., 2012), 
and poor self-concept (Sandstrom & Zakriski, 2004).  Some studies have used Cyberball 
to induce the experience of social exclusion during middle childhood and adolescence 
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with similar negative psychological responses as adults, such as threatening self-esteem 
and the need for belonging (e.g., Abrams, Weick, Thomas, Colbe, & Franklin, 2011; 
Bolling et al., 2011; Moor et al., 2012).  However, these studies have only used real 
social interactions.  It would be interesting to see if children are equally as distressed 
when they are excluded by fictional characters and by walls in the Control Condition.  
Based on previous research with adults, I would expect for children to be equally as 
distressed when being excluded by fictional co-players and real co-players, but just as I 
hypothesized for adults, children might not feel distressed when they are excluded by 
walls. 
Conclusion 
This dissertation research contributed to the development of a measure of 
prosocial behavior using Cyberball and a Control Condition that does not involve social 
interaction.  In addition, I suggested several modifications to Cyberball that would 
improve the usefulness of the paradigm as a measure of prosocial behavior to be used in 
the future. 
Despite the limitations of the current form of Cyberball, the findings of Study 2 
suggest that children had similar emotional reactions, but differing behavioral reactions, 
in response to real and fictional social interactions.  If this result is replicated in future 
research, it could have implications for clinical and educational settings.  Fiction might 
be a particularly effective and safe way for children to explore, understand, and regulate 
their emotions.  In fictional contexts, such as pretend play, children are not burdened by 
the social obligation to act in a particular way and instead they have the freedom to act in 
any way they please.  Thus, in fictional contexts, children have the opportunity to 
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experiment with alternative ways of behaving and then experience the corresponding 
emotional consequences of their actions.  
 
  
EXAMPLES OF CYBERBALL FOR STUDY 1
Example of the Real Condition
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Example of the Control Condition
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APPENDIX B 
 
REACTIONS TO CYBERBALL QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
The following statements describe a large number of common reactions to Cyberball.  
There are no “right” or “wrong” answers; the best answer is the immediate, spontaneous 
one.  Read carefully each phrase and mark the answer that reflects your first reaction.  
Sometimes you will be asked to elaborate on your response (please answer these 
questions in the space provided). Please use the following scale to indicate the degree to 
which each statement is true for you: 
 
1     2   3         4            5 
never or occasionally true sometimes true often true         almost always 
almost never true       
   or always true 
 
1.  I liked the Cyberball game. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
2.  When I was playing with the other students, I had a favorite player. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
If you did, who was your favorite player?__________________________________ 
 
3.  When I was playing with the other students, I thought everyone got the ball the same 
amount. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
4. When I was playing with the other students, I thought one of the players was treated 
unfairly. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Please explain why you responded this way.  
5.  When I was playing with the other students, I threw the ball to one player most of the 
time. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Please explain why you responded this way.  
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6.  When I was doing the calibration check, I thought that one of the walls did NOT get 
the ball as often as the other walls did. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
7.  When I was doing the calibration check, I threw the ball to all the walls. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Please explain why you responded in this way.  
 
8.  When I was doing the calibration check, I thought all of the walls were included 
equally. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Please explain why you responded in this way.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
MANIPULATION CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Please read the questions carefully and answer honestly.  Sometimes you will be asked to 
elaborate on your response (please answer the questions in the space provided). 
 
1.  Did you think there was anything strange about the game? no___ yes__ 
If yes, what did you think was strange? 
2.  Did you think that maybe we were testing something about what you did while you 
were playing the game?  no_______ yes_______ 
 
3.  What did you think we were studying with the Cyberball task? 
4.  Did you think anything was unusual about the other students? no___ yes__ 
If yes, what did you think was unusual about the students? 
5.  Did you think there was anything unusual about the calibration check? no___   yes__ 
If yes, what did you think was unusual about the calibration check? 
 
6.  To what extent did you think you were playing with real students? 
 
0%     10%     20%     30%     40%       50%       60%       70%       80%       90%       100%        
 
not at all               neutral      a lot 
 
7.  To what extent did you think we were measuring your reaction time in the calibration 
check? 
 
0%     10%      20%     30%     40%       50%       60%       70%       80%       90%       100%        
 
not at all     neutral     a lot 
 
Thank you! 
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APPENDIX D 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CYBERBALL FOR STUDY 1 
 
Real Condition first 
The people you will be playing with are Suzanne, Phoebe, and Melinda/Randy, 
Joel, and Kevin [while looking at sticky note with names on it].  The game is simple – 
you just toss the ball around between the four of you.  When you get the ball, you can 
throw it to whomever you want.  To toss the ball to a player, you’ll use the 1, 2, 3 keys 
[point to keys] – those keys match up to the locations like this  - this is a little bit like 
what you’ll see with different pictures, this is just an example [show picture of Cyberball 
locations with #s].  Your picture will be here, with your name [point to participant 
location] and the other players will be here [point to other locations].  You’ll push the 1 
key to throw the ball to this person [point to location], the 2 key to throw the ball to this 
person [point to location], or the 3 key to throw the ball to this person [point to location].  
The other students will see a game much like the one you see, but their locations will be a 
little different than what you see.  For example, they’ll see their own picture in this 
location [point to participant location] and you and the two other participants will go in 
these locations [point to other locations].  The important thing to know is that if, for 
example, you throw the ball to Trevor, that everybody will see you throw the ball to 
Trevor, and Trevor will be the person who gets the ball and he’ll throw it next.   It is very 
important to only press the number keys when you get the ball, so pay close attention to 
who is tossing the ball to who and ONLY press key when you have the ball in your hand.  
This round of the game will last about 6 minutes.  When you’re done, you can just let me 
know and I’ll give you more instructions.  After you get started, I’ll leave so you can play 
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the game on your own.  Do you have any questions?  [answer any questions they have]  
Are you ready to play?  [when they are ready to play] Ok, the other players should be 
ready to play too.  Let’s check.  Go ahead and click ‘Start Playing Now’.  [wait for game 
to load]  Ok, it looks like everybody is ready to play!  [Wait for participant to get the ball 
at least once, to see that they get the game.]  Ok, I’ll come back when you’re done.  
[Experimenter 1 leaves room.] 
 
Control Condition first 
The calibration check is simple - you just toss the ball around between yourself 
and three walls.  This time, the computer will control where the ball is tossed, except for 
when you get the ball.  When you get the ball, you’ll choose which location to toss the 
ball to - you can toss the ball to wherever you want.  You won’t be able to control the 
angle at which the ball bounces off the walls – that’s not the point of the calibration 
check, we’re just trying to get a measure of your average reaction time when you get the 
ball and we’re calibrating it with our internet connection.  So, I don’t want you to 
purposefully go fast or slow or anything, I want you to choose where you want to toss the 
ball naturally.  To toss the ball to a wall, you’ll use the 1, 2, 3 keys [point to keys] – those 
keys match up to the locations like this [show laminated picture of Cyberball locations 
with #s]. Your picture will appear here [point to participant location].  You’ll push the 1 
key to throw the ball to this wall [point to location], the 2 key to throw the ball to this 
wall [point to location], or the 3 key to throw the ball to this wall [point to location]. It is 
very important to only press the number keys when you get the ball, so pay close 
attention to where the ball is going and ONLY press key when you have the ball in your 
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hand.  The calibration check will last about 6 minutes.  When you’re done, you can just 
let me know and I’ll give you more instructions.  After you get started, I’ll leave so you 
can do the calibration on your own.  Do you have any questions?  [answer any questions 
they have]  Are you ready to play?  [when they are ready to play] Ok, go ahead and click 
‘Start Calibration Now’.  [wait for game to load]  I’ll come back when you’re done.  
[Experimenter 1 leaves room.] 
 
  
EXAMPLES OF CYBERBALL FOR STUDY 2
Example of the Real Condition
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Example of the Fiction Condition
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Example of the Control Condition
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NOVEL CARTOON CHARAC
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APPENDIX F 
 
TERS USED IN THE FICTION CONDITION IN 
STUDY 2 
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APPENDIX G 
 
BERKELEY PUPPET INTERVIEW: REACTIONS TO CYBERBALL ITEMS 
 
 
Iggy:  Do you remember when you played the ball tossing game with the walls?  (Wait 
for child to respond.) When I was playing with the walls, I thought one of the 
walls did not get the ball very much. 
Ziggy: I thought every wall got the ball the same amount. 
  What did you think? 
Probe question (if says he/she thought a wall didn’t get the ball very much): Which wall 
didn’t get the ball very much? 
 
 
Iggy: When I was playing with the walls, I had a favorite wall. 
Ziggy: I didn’t have a favorite wall. 
  How about you? 
Probe question (if says he/she had a favorite wall): Which wall was your favorite? 
 
 
Iggy: When I was playing with the walls, I threw the ball to every wall. 
Ziggy: I threw the ball to one wall. 
   How about you? 
Probe question (if says he/she threw the ball to one wall): Which wall did you throw the 
ball to?  Why did you throw the ball to that one? 
 
 
Ziggy: I liked the ball tossing game. 
Iggy: I didn’t like the ball tossing game. 
  What about you? 
 
 
Ziggy:  Do you remember when you were playing the ball tossing game with the other 
kids – Phoebe, Suzanne, and Melinda/Joel, Kevin, and Randy? When I was 
playing with the kids, I thought one of the kids did not get the ball very much. 
Iggy: I thought everyone got the ball the same amount. 
   What did you think? 
Probe question (if says he/she thought somebody didn’t get the ball very much): Who 
didn’t get the ball very much? 
 
 
Iggy: When I was playing with the kids, I felt bad for one of the kids. 
Ziggy: I didn’t feel bad for any of the kids. 
  What about you? 
Probe question (if says he/she felt bad): Who did you feel bad for?  Why did you feel bad 
for [name]? 
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Ziggy: When I was playing with the kids, I had a favorite kid. 
Iggy: I didn’t have a favorite kid. 
  How about you? 
Probe question (if says he/she had a favorite player): Who was your favorite player? 
 
 
Ziggy: When I was playing with the kids, I threw the ball to everyone. 
Iggy: When I was playing with the kids, I threw the ball to one kid. 
   What about you? 
Probe question (if says he/she threw the ball to one player): Who did you throw the ball 
to?  Why did you throw the ball to them? 
 
 
Iggy: When I was playing the ball tossing game with the kids, I thought the players were 
real kids playing the game on the internet. 
Ziggy: I didn’t think the players were real kids playing the game on the internet. 
   How about you? 
Probe question (if says he/she didn’t think the players were real kids): What made you 
think this?  How did you think the game worked? 
 
 
Ziggy: When I was playing with the kids, I thought one of the kids was treated unfairly. 
Iggy: I thought all of the kids were treated fairly. 
   What did you think? 
Probe question (if says he/she thought one player was treated unfairly): Who did you 
think was treated unfairly?  What was unfair about how they were treated? 
 
 
Iggy: Do you remember the ball tossing game with the pretend characters – Zoony, 
Beamer, and Razzle?  When I was playing with the characters, I thought one of 
the characters did not get the ball very much. 
Ziggy: I thought everyone got the ball the same amount. 
  What did you think? 
Probe question (if says he/she thought somebody didn’t get the ball very much): Who 
didn’t get the ball very much? 
 
 
Ziggy: When I was playing with the characters, I felt bad for one of the characters. 
Iggy: I didn’t feel bad for any of the characters. 
  How about you? 
Probe question (if says he/she felt bad): Who did you feel bad for?  Why did you feel bad 
for [name]? 
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Iggy: When I was playing with the characters, I had a favorite character. 
Ziggy: I didn’t have a favorite character. 
  What about you? 
Probe question (if says he/she had a favorite player): Who was your favorite player? 
 
 
Ziggy: When I was playing with the characters, I threw the ball to one character. 
Iggy: I threw the ball to everyone. 
   How about you? 
Probe question (if says he/she threw the ball to one player): Who did you throw the ball 
to?  Why did you throw the ball to them? 
 
 
Iggy: When I was playing with the characters, I thought all of the characters were treated 
fairly.  
Ziggy: I thought one of the characters was treated unfairly. 
   What did you think? 
Probe question (if says he/she thought one player was treated unfairly): Who did you 
think was treated unfairly?  What was unfair about how they were treated? 
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APPENDIX H 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CYBERBALL FOR STUDY 2 
 
Control Condition first 
Now you will play the ball tossing game where you play with nobody at all.  The 
game is simple - you will be tossing the ball around between yourself and 3 different 
walls.  It will look a little bit like this [show picture of Cyberball locations with arrows].  
You will see your own picture and your own name here [point to participant location] and 
you’ll also see these walls [point to walls].  When you get the ball, you can throw it 
wherever you want.  To toss the ball to the wall, you’ll use these arrow buttons [point to 
arrow buttons on button box] – those arrows match up to the walls like this [show picture 
of Cyberball locations with arrows].  You’ll push this arrow [point to left arrow on the 
button box] to throw the ball to this wall [point to left wall on picture], see how the 
arrows match up [point to left arrow on the button box and the arrow next to the left wall 
on the picture]?  You’ll use this arrow [point to up arrow on button box] to throw to this 
wall [point to the upper wall on the picture], see how the arrows match up [point to up 
arrow on the button box and the arrow next to the upper wall on the picture]?  And you’ll 
push this arrow [point to right arrow on the button box] to throw to this wall [point to 
right wall on the picture], see how the arrows match up [point to right arrow on the button 
box and the arrow next to the right wall on the picture]?  Want to try it?  Ok!  
[Participants then practiced playing Cyberball while Experimenter 1 pointed out the 
participant and wall locations and narrated which wall was getting the ball and asked the 
child where he or she wanted to throw the ball when he or she received it.  Experimenter 
1 ended the practice session after the child received the ball 3 times, then quickly set up 
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Cyberball for the Control Condition.  When Cyberball was ready, Experimenter 1 
continued with the script.]  Ok, now we’re ready to play the game with the walls.  It is 
very important to only press the arrows when you get the ball in your hand – you’ll see 
the ball in your hand here [point to hand on Cyberball picture], so pay close attention to 
where the ball is going and ONLY press the arrow key when you have the ball in your 
hand.  When the game is over, you can just let me know.  I’ll be sitting back there doing 
some work [Experimenter 1 sat at a small table in the testing room with the child].  Do 
you have any questions?  Are you ready to play? Ok, it’s all ready for you. 
Real Condition first 
Now you will play the ball tossing game with other kids.  The other kids you will 
be playing with are Suzanne, Phoebe, and Melinda/Randy, Joel, and Kevin [while 
looking at sticky note with names on it].  The game is simple – you just toss the ball 
around between the four of you.  It will look a little bit like this.  [show picture of 
Cyberball locations with arrows]  You will see your own picture and your own name here 
[point to participant location] and you’ll also see these little throwing guys with pictures 
above them [point to co-player locations].  The pictures above the throwing guys are 
pictures of other kids that you’ll be playing with – you’ll see different kids than these.  
Each of these kids will be controlling a little throwing guy.  You will be too – the other 
kids will see your picture above a throwing guy.  When you get the ball, you can throw it 
wherever you want.  To toss the ball to a kid, you’ll use the arrow buttons [point to arrow 
buttons on the button box] – those arrows match up to the kids like this [show picture of 
Cyberball locations with arrows].  You’ll push this arrow [point to left arrow on the 
button box] to throw the ball to this kid [point to left kid on picture], see how the arrows 
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match up [point to left arrow on the button box and the arrow next to the left kid on the 
picture]?  You’ll use this arrow [point to up arrow on button box] to throw to this kid 
[point to the upper kid on the picture], see how the arrows match up [point to up arrow on 
the button box and the arrow next to the upper kid on the picture]?  And you’ll push this 
arrow [point to right arrow on the button box] to throw to this kid [point to right kid on 
the picture], see how the arrows match up [point to right arrow on the button box and the 
arrow next to the right kid on the picture]?  Want to try it?  Ok! [Participants then 
practiced playing Cyberball while Experimenter 1 pointed out the participant and co-
player locations and names and narrated who was getting the ball and asked the child 
where he or she wanted to throw the ball when he or she received it.  Experimenter 1 
ended the practice session after the child received the ball 3 times, then quickly set up 
Cyberball for the Real Condition.  When Cyberball was ready, Experimenter 1 continued 
with the script.]  Ok, now we’re ready to play the game with the kids.  It is very important 
to only press the arrows when you get the ball in your hand – you’ll see the ball in your 
hand here [point to hand on Cyberball picture], so pay close attention to where the ball is 
going and ONLY press key when you have the ball in your hand.  When the game is 
over, you can just let me know.  I’ll be sitting back there doing some work.  
[Experimenter 1 sat at a small table in the testing room with the child]  Do you have any 
questions?  Are you ready to play?  Ok, it’s all ready for you. 
Fiction Condition first 
Now you will play the ball tossing game with the cartoon characters – they are 
just pretend.  The pretend cartoon characters you will be playing with are Zoony, 
Beamer, and Razzle.  The game is simple – you just toss the ball around between the four 
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of you.  It will look a little bit like this.  [show picture of Cyberball locations with arrows]  
You will see your own picture and your own name here [point to participant location] and 
you’ll also see these little throwing guys with pictures above them [point to co-player 
locations].  The pictures above the throwing guys are pictures of characters that you’ll be 
playing with – you’ll see different cartoon characters than these.  When you get the ball, 
you can throw it wherever you want.  To toss the ball to a pretend cartoon character, 
you’ll use the arrow buttons [point to arrow buttons on the button box] – those arrows 
match up to the cartoon characters like this [show picture of Cyberball locations with 
arrows]. You’ll push this arrow [point to left arrow on the button box] to throw the ball to 
this character [point to left character on picture], see how the arrows match up [point to 
left arrow on the button box and the arrow next to the left kid on the picture]?  You’ll use 
this arrow [point to up arrow on button box] to throw to this character [point to the upper 
character on the picture], see how the arrows match up [point to up arrow on the button 
box and the arrow next to the upper character on the picture]?  And you’ll push this arrow 
[point to right arrow on the button box] to throw to this character [point to right character 
on the picture], see how the arrows match up [point to right arrow on the button box and 
the arrow next to the right kid on the picture]?  Want to try it?  Ok! [Participants then 
practiced playing Cyberball while Experimenter 1 pointed out the participant and co-
player locations and names and narrated who was getting the ball and asked the child 
where he or she wanted to throw the ball when he or she received it.  Experimenter 1 
ended the practice session after the child received the ball 3 times, then quickly set up 
Cyberball for the Fiction Condition.  When Cyberball was ready, Experimenter 1 
continued with the script.]  Ok, now we’re ready to play the game with the cartoon 
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characters.  It is very important to only press the arrows when you get the ball in your 
hand – you’ll see the ball in your hand here [point to hand on Cyberball picture], so pay 
close attention to where the ball is going and ONLY press key when you have the ball in 
your hand.  When the game is over, you can just let me know.  I’ll be sitting back there 
doing some work.  [Experimenter 1 sat at a small table in the testing room with the child]  
Do you have any questions?  Are you ready to play?  Ok, it’s all ready for you. 
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